Volume 20

Issue 1

Article 4

1974

Congressional Immunity: A Criticism of Exisiting Distinctions and
a Proposal for a New Definitional Approach
X. L. Suarez

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr
Part of the Constitutional Law Commons, and the Legislation Commons

Recommended Citation
X. L. Suarez, Congressional Immunity: A Criticism of Exisiting Distinctions and a Proposal for a New
Definitional Approach, 20 Vill. L. Rev. 97 (1974).
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol20/iss1/4

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital
Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Villanova Law Review by an authorized editor of Villanova
University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository.

Suarez: Congressional Immunity: A Criticism of Exisiting Distinctions and
NOVEMBER, 1974]

CONGRESSIONAL IMMUNITY: A CRITICISM OF EXISTING
DISTINCTIONS AND A PROPOSAL FOR A
NEW DEFINITIONAL APPROACH*
X. L. SUAREZt
I.

L EGISLATIVE

INTRODUCTION

PRIVILEGE or immunity is the constitutional

protection afforded Members of Congress by the well-known
speech or debate clause of the United States Constitution which provides that "for any Speech or Debate in either House, [the Senators
and Representatives] shall not be questioned in any other Place."'
This simple phrase has served to ensure the integrity and independence
of the Congress throughout its two-hundred year history, just as similar
clauses had protected the parliaments of England and our early colonial
assemblies.'
The early and authoritative Massachusetts case of Coffin v. Coffin'
defined the immunity as covering "everything said or done by . . . a
representative in the exercise of the functions of that office." ' This
* In this study, I was assisted by Mr. Ray Gooch, Counsel, Joint Committee
on Congressional Operations. He contributed directly to the introduction and indirectly
to the remainder of this article. His clarity of thought helped me maintain my sanity
while focusing in upon the crucial issues.
I must also thank my advisor, Professor Phillip Heyman, for directing my
writing and for urging me to give more credit to Supreme Court Opinions, so that
I would look for the hidden gems in the rough, the valuable insights hidden by the
confusing language.
I must additionally thank former Congressman George Meader, for believing
in and arguing for the independence of Congress.
Finally, I must thank my law school colleagues for being the ever-patient
sounding boards for my ideas.
t Mr. Suarez is currently a senior student at the Harvard Law School. B.M.E.,
Villanova University, 1971; J.D. (expected), Harvard University, 1975; M.P.P.
(expected), John F. Kennedy School of Government, 1975. The author was employed
as a clerk to the Committee Counsel of the Joint Committee on Congressional
Operations during the summer of 1973.
1. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6. Section 6 provides:
The Senators and Representatives shall receive a Compensation for their Services,
to be ascertained by Law, and paid out of the Treasury of the United States.
They shall in all Cases, except Treason, Felony and Breach of the Peace, be
privileged from Arrest during their Attendance at the Session of their respective
Houses, and in going to and returning from the same; and for any Speech or
Debate in either House, they shall not be questioned in any other Place.
Id.
2. Reinstein & Silverglate, Legislative Privilege and the Separation of Powers,
86 HARV. L. REV. 1113, 1120-35 (1973).
3. Id. at 1136 n.121.
4. 4 Mass. 9, 4 Tyng 1 (1808).
5. Id. at 31, 4 Tyng at 27.

(97)

Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1974

1

Villanova Law Review, Vol. 20, Iss. 1 [1974], Art. 4
VILLANOVA

LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 20: p. 97

statement itself contains a very controversial notion, since it implies
that legislative immunity extends beyond the strict language of the
clause to cover conduct as well as speech of a legislator.' The ultimate
objective of this study is to determine the nature and scope of congressional activities protected by the clause. The analysis is for the most
part definitional rather than functional; that is, it deals with the issue
at a fairly general level. A more functional analysis utilizing the definitions that I propose 7 would make it easier to resolve fully the existing
cases and hypotheticals.
It is important to both an understanding and an appreciation of
this freedom from accountability of legislators to bear in mind that
legislative immunity is not the personal privilege or perquisite of office
of the elected representative. Rather, it is intended to serve the interests
of the electors8 - the people whose votes send a man or woman to
Congress for the purpose of representing them, their interests, views,
and concerns, upon all national and international legislative issues.
The guarantee of that independent representation implicit in the constitutionally established democratic system of government is denied
when the elected representative is subject to "prosecution by an unfriendly executive and conviction by a hostile judiciary" ' for an act
undertaken in the discharge of his legislative duties. The speech or
debate clause seeks not to spare the legislator the inconvenience of
responding to executive or judicial inquiries into his conduct, but to
ensure that the legislator is not distracted or deterred from effectively
performing his representative function. 1°
There is, however, some measure of accountability for Members
of Congress. Misdeeds and indiscretions, prompted by venal or corrupt
motives on the part of the legislator, even if protected by the constitutional immunity barring inquiry "in any other Place," are proper
subjects of inquiry and action for the congressional colleagues of the
offender in the House of which he is a member. The doctrine of legislative immunity carries with it the responsibility that each body of
the Congress keep its own house in order. Article I, section 5 of the
Constitution established that "[e] ach House may ... punish its Members for disorderly Behaviour, and, with the concurrence of two thirds,
expel a Member.""
6. See text accompanying note 39 infra.
7. See text accompanying notes 250-65 infra.
8. Coffin v. Coffin, 4 Mass. 9, 31, 4 Tyng 1, 27 (1808).
9. United States v. Johnson, 383 U.S. 169, 179 (1966).
10. See text accompanying note 41 infra.
11. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5.
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol20/iss1/4
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Recent court decisions have suggested that the apparent lack of
will upon the part of Congress to accept and discharge this responsi2
bility encourages disciplinary actions outside the halls of Congress.'
These decisions have given rise to congressional concern, as expressed
by Senator Ervin in the following statement:
We might resign ourselves to the view that the unbridled
expansion of executive privilege and the withering of legislative
privilege are part of an inevitable trend of aggrandizement of power
in the Presidency evidenced through American history. But if we
do so, we profane our oaths to uphold the Constitution and indeed
we may preside over the funeral of our system of government."
Three recent decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States
have focused upon the constitutional role of the legislative branch, and
specifically, how that role should be defined for purposes of the immunity.' 4 These decisions interpreting the speech or debate clause and
its grant of immunity from judicial proceedings in civil and criminal
actions have prompted Senator Metcalf to describe the actions of the
High Court as resulting in the "narrowest definition of what constitutes
a legislative act that has ever been announced by the Supreme Court
in the almost 200 year history of the speech or debate clause,"'" and
Senator Ervin to criticize the decisions as "tinker [ing] with the very
heart of the constitutional doctrine of separation of powers."1" Do
these recent decisions in fact represent a substantial narrowing of the
scope of the clause as previously defined? and if they do, does that
actually affect the vitality of the separation of powers doctrine? These
questions, as well as the question of what each of the two branches of
government should do to remedy the situation, are central to the present
study.
The three decisions referred to above increased from five to eight
the number of decisions announced by the Supreme Court involving
12. See, e.g., United States v. Brewster, 408 U.S. 501, 518 (1972) where Chief
Justice Burger stated that Congress was:
ill-equipped to investigate, try, and punish its Members for a wide range of
behavior that is loosely and incidentally related to the legislative process . . .
Congress has shown little inclination to exert itself in this area.
Id. at 518-19.
13. Hearings on Constitutional Immunity of Members of Congress Before the
Joint Committee on Congressional Operations, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 17 (1973)
[hereinafter cited as 1973 Hearings].
14. Doe v. McMillan, 412 U.S. 306 (1973) ; Gravel v. United States, 408 U.S.
606 (1972) ; United States v. Brewster, 408 U.S. 501 (1972.).
15. 1973 Hearings,supra note 13, at 3.
16. Id. at 11.
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interpretations of the speech or debate clause. The three were handed
down in the relatively brief span of 11 months, 7 while the first five had
taken nearly 200 years.' 8 In this study, these eight Supreme Court
decisions will be analyzed in an effort to extract the definitional approaches contained in those decisions. These approaches, as well as
another proposed recently by commentators, are criticized and a determination made of their constitutional and logical validity. Subsequently,
I propose my own definitional approach and discuss how each of the
two concerned branches -

the Judiciary and the Congress -

should

implement that approach.
Throughout the analysis, no distinction is made between conduct
by individual legislators as opposed to actions taken by a committee or
the full Congress since the immunity applies both to individual legislators and to groups acting in a more "official" fashion: the protection
is both personal and institutional.
One should keep in mind, however, that one element of the definitional approach I propose is the determination of how central to the
legislative function a particular activity is. Insofar as actions by
individual Congressmen 9 outside officially sanctioned proceedings may
be considered less central to the functions of the legislature, there may
be less justification for extending the scope of the clause to include such
actions. However, one must be cautious in making any generalizations
upon this point, for legislators function in a very individualized manner
much of the time. Indeed, to think of the Congress as a monolithic body
is to misunderstand the legislative process. The elected representatives
in action resemble more a multilateral tug of war than a column of
ordered troops." ° Their functioning should be studied with that fact in
mind.
17. The period extended from June 29, 1972, through May 29, 1973. The cases
decided were Doe v. McMillan, 412 U.S. 306 (1973) ; Gravel v. United States, 408
U.S. 606 (1972) ; United States v. Brewster, 408 U.S. 501 (1972).
18. Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486 (1968) was only the fifth Supreme
Court decision interpreting the clause since the beginning of the Republic. The first
four, in the order decided, were Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U.S. 168 (1881) ; Tenney
v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367 (1951) ; United States v. Johnson; 383 U.S. 169 (1966)
and Dombrowski v. Eastland, 387 U.S. 82 (1967).
19. The term "Congressman" and its plural will be used to refer to Senators
and Representatives as a general class.
20. See text accompanying notes 217-30 infra for a discussion of problems
associated with a formal definition of the "legislative process." Attempts at formulating
such a limited definition, which might be appropriate in describing the judiciary, are
inapposite here.

https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol20/iss1/4

4

Suarez: Congressional Immunity: A Criticism of Exisiting Distinctions and
NOVEMBER,

1974]

CONGRESSIONAL

II.
A.

IMMUNITY

THE CASES

The Early Cases

The first case in which the Supreme Court interpreted the speech
or debate clause was Kilbourn v. Thompson, 2' decided in 1881. The
case arose out of a congressional investigation into the bankruptcy of
a firm in debt to the federal government. The plaintiff Kilbourn, who
presumably possessed information about the bankrupt firm, refused to
comply with a congressional subpoena duces tecum, and accordingly
was held in contempt of Congress. 2 ' The Sergeant at Arms of the House
delivered Kilbourn to jail in accordance with a vote of the House of
Representatives.2' Kilbourn brought an action for false imprisonment
against the Sergeant at Arms, the Speaker of the House, and four mem2
bers of a special committee appointed to investigate the bankruptcy. 1
The Supreme Court held that the congressional investigation was
concerned with a case of a "judicial nature," 5 and thus not within the
"jurisdiction" of the House. 26 This conclusion was apparently premised
upon a finding that the investigation was really an inquiry into the
"personal affairs of individuals" and thus "no valid legislation on
the
27
subject" could result from it.
It should be noted that this conclusion did not rest solely upon an
abstract examination of the facts presented by the case: practical considerations also entered into the balance. The fact that the case was
under consideration by the District Court for the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania when Congress initiated the proceeding 2 undoubtedly
made it easier to conclude that the Congress had no authority to coerce
Kilbourn's disclosure upon this subject matter. Perhaps because of
this fact the Court was not compelled to delve more deeply into the
conceptual distinction between legislative and judicial acts.
The Kilbourn facts indicate that the Congress was concerned with
executive conduct - the degree to which the Secretary of the Navy
and other public officials were involved in the bankrupt real estate pool. 29
An investigation into a bankruptcy involving public figures and public
monies, such as Kilbourn presents, cannot easily be cast outside the
scope of congressional inquiry. This is true particularly in view of the
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.

103 U.S. 168 (1881).
Id. at 171-77.
Id. at 173-75.
Id. at 170-72.
Id. at 194.
Id. at 196.
Id. at 195.
Id. at 193.
Id. at 171, 193.
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historically broad nature of the congressional power of inquiry. As
research has shown, the British tradition which gave Parliament power
to inquire "into every conceivable aspect of executive conduct"3 was
instilled by the Founding Fathers into our own Constitution.3 ' The
Court, however, chose to ignore this history of legislative inquiry and
required a high correlation between the congressional investigation and
subsequent enactment of legislation. 2 Since the necessary correlation
was lacking in the Kilbourn facts, the Court held the investigation to
be outside the "jurisdiction" of the House. 3
It is unfortunate that the Court adopted this analysis to grant
relief to Kilbourn when more limited approaches were available. 4 A
court undertaking to decide such basic separation of powers questions
should do so with extreme care. In my opinion, the careless approach
evinced by the Court in Kilbourn was a portent of things to come the generally inadequate treatment of the speech or debate clause by the
Court in the few cases it has chosen to decide.
Even though the Court characterized the congressional investigations as nonlegislative, the speech or debate clause was held to protect the Congressmen.35 However, the agent who executed the order
was in no way protected." This dichotomy between a legislator and
his agent became an important element of subsequent decisions.3
In holding that the Congressmen's activities were immune, Kilbourn
left an important legacy in Justice Miller's discussion of the scope of
legislative activities which were protected by speech or debate immunity

:31

It would be a narrow view of the constitutional provision to
limit it to words spoken in debate. The reason of the rule is as
forcible in its application to written reports presented in that body
by its committees, to resolutions offered, which, though in writing,
must be reproduced in speech, and to the act of voting, whether it
be done vocally or by passing between the tellers. In short, to
things generally done in a session of the House by one of its members in relation to the business before it.3"
30. Berger, The Washington Post, July 24, 1973, at A20, col. 3.

31. Id.
32. 103 U.S. at 195-96.
33. Id. at 196.
34. The Court could have reached the same result upon the basis that Congress
had given jurisdiction of such contempt proceedings to the courts and was acting
illegally in imprisoning Kilbourn without judicial sanction. Alternatively, the questioning of Kilbourn, a private citizen, could have been judged insufficiently pertinent to
any valid congressional purpose. See text accompanying notes 278-81 infra.
35. 103 U.S, at 203-05.
36. Id. at 205.
37. See section liA infra.
38. 103 U.S. at 201-04.
39. Id. at 204 (emphasis added).
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Justice Miller's citation of the Massachusetts decision of Coffin %,.
Coffin40 was indicative of the range of activities he thought the clause
protected. He adopted the Massachusetts court's rationale for speech
or debate protection and the breadth of construction that flowed therefrom:
These privileges are thus secured, not with the intention of
protecting members against prosecutions for their own benefit,
but to support the rights of the people, by enabling their representatives to execute the functions of their office without fear of
prosecutions, civil or criminal. I, therefore, think that the article
ought not to be construed strictly, but liberally, that the full design
of it may be answered. I will not confine it to delivering an opinion,
uttering a speech, or haranguing in debate, but will extend it to
the giving of a vote, to the making of a written report, and to every
other act resulting from the nature and in the execution of the
office. 4 '
The Kilbourn court also relied upon the expansive interpretation
in Coffin that, for purposes of speech or debate protection, a member
was not "confined to his place in the House," and that "there are cases
in which he is entitled to this privilege when not within the halls of
the representative's chamber."42 Thus, although the facts of Kilbourn
brought only the vote of a Congressman under the speech or debate
immunity, the Coffin language used seemed to indicate a broad range of
protected activities.
For 70 years after Kilbourn, the Supreme Court found no occasion
to further interpret the speech or debate clause. Then, in a 1951 decision, Tenney v. Brandhove,5 the Court considered the clause in the
context of a suit against state legislators. In Tenney the Court held
that an immunity much like that explicitly given to Congressmen by
the Constitution alsd existed implicitly for state legislators. 4 Since it
applies to state legislators, Tenney is not really a case of congressional'
40. 4 Mass. 9, 4 Tyng 1 (1808). In Coffin, a representative of the Massachusetts.
House of Representatives was held liable for slander when he called someone a
"convict" and a "bank-robber," notwithstanding the fact that the plaintiff had been.
acquitted. Id. at 9, 4 Tyng at 24-25. The Massachusetts court felt that even though
the representative had been within the walls of the House, his speech was not protected
when made informally to another representative, and not as a part of his functioningas a representative. Id. at 36-7, 4 Tyng at 33-34. Although the Court held against.
the representative, there was much dicta in the case which manifested a feeling that.
the privilege should be interpreted liberally. Id. at 35-36, 4 Tyng at 32-33.
41. 103 U.S. at 203, quoting Coffin v. Coffin, 4 Mass. 9, 31, 4 Tyng 1, 27 (1808)..
42. Id. at 203-04, quoting Coffin v. Coffin, 4 Mass. 9, 31, 4 Tyng 1, 27 (1808)..
43. 341 U.S. 367 (1951).
44. Id. at 372-75. The Court's doubt that Congress could have "constitutional.
powerbyto
limit the
freedomCharles
of state
legislators
Published
Villanova
University
Widger
School ofacting
Law Digital
1974
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immunities in the strict sense; however, it is valuable in that it clarifies
to an extent the concept of a protected "sphere of legitimate legislative
activity,"4 wherein legislators are immune.
The case arose out of a suit against members of a committee of the
California State Legislature. Brandhove had appeared as a witness
before the committee and had subsequently circulated a petition urging
the discontinuance of the committee's activities. After being ordered by
the committee to reappear for questioning concerning his petition,
Brandhove refused to give further testimony and was consequently
cited for contempt. In addition, the chairman of the committee read
into the record Brandhove's prior testimony, as well as a statement
concerning his alleged criminal record and denials of the allegations of
his petition. Brandhove's suit against the committee alleged violations
of various constitutional rights, including his right to free speech, due
process, and equal protection of the laws.47
Writing for the Court, Justice Frankfurter found that the California Legislature's investigation in Tenney was within the scope of
legitimate legislative concerns. 4" In so concluding, Frankfurter established a difficult threshold over which courts must pass before imposing
liability upon legislators for their actions in committee: For a court to
determine that a legislative committee has exceeded the bounds of its
power "it must be obvious that there was a usurpation of functions exclusively vested in the Judiciary or the Executive." 49
The Court was even more specific in asserting what was not a
possible ground for imposing liability upon legislators: the "claim of an
unworthy purpose" in the legislators was held not to "destroy the
privilege."" ° This was a significant principle, since it limited the scope
of a court's license to review the activities of the legislature and insulated
the legislator from politically inspired charges of improper motives for
seemed to extend constitutional dimensions to the immunity of state legislators,
concerning which the Constitution itself is silent. Id. at 376.
Although California, the jurisdiction involved in Tenney, provides for legislative immunity from service of process, it is one of the few states without a state
constitutional provision analogous to the speech or debate clause. Compare CAL.
CONST. art. 4, § 11, with MASS. CONST., Pt. First, art. 21. The latter provision was
interpreted in Coffin. 4 Mass. at 14-15, 4 Tyng at 6-7.

45. 341 U.S. at 376.
46. Id. at 370-71.
47. Id. at 371.
.48. Id. at 378-79.
49, Id. at 378.
50. Id. at 377.
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committee activities." Frankfurter concluded that the sole judicial determination was whether a committee's inquiry was within its powers.",
The majority opinion, despite its emphatic buttressing of the
Kilbourn-Coffin rationale for legislative immunity (and the concomitant
broad protection for Congressmen)," added little in the way of new law
to the area of legislative immunity. Rather, it was the concurring opinion of Justice Black which furnished a wholly new insight into this
field of the law,54 for Black began to clarify the Kilbourn reasoning,
which had held the investigation there to be outside the "jurisdiction"5 5
of the House of Representatives because it was of judicial nature" and
yet exempted the Congressmen from liability for their actions which
57
were related to that same investigation.
The Tenney majority did not concern itself with the possible
extension of speech or debate immunity to legislative actions which
could simultaneously be held illegitimate or unconstitutional. The opinion stated only that the Tenney committee members were protected
because the committee's inquiry could "fairly be deemed within its
province." ' In terms of the Kilbourn language, did this mean that the
committee had had "jurisdiction" in that area? If so, it would seem
that execution of any order flowing from the investigative necessities
of the inquiry would have been protected by speech or debate immunity.5
Otherwise, a new theory would have to be fashioned to withhold protection from actions executed pursuant to a legitimate congressional
investigation." The majority did not attempt to fashion such a theory.
51. Id. Frankfurter stated:
Legislators are immune from deterrents to the uninhibited discharge of their
legislative duty, not for their private indulgence but for the public good. One.
must not expect uncommon courage even in legislators. The privilege would be,
of little value if they could be subjected to the cost and inconvenience and
distractions of a trial upon the conclusion of the pleader, or to the hazard of a,
judgment against them based upon a jury's speculation as to motives.

Id.
52. Id. at 378.
53. Id. at 373-76. See text accompanying notes 40-42 supra.
54. 341 U.S. at 379 (Black, J., concurring). See text accompanying notes 62-65,

infra.
55. Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U.S. 168, 196 (1881).
56. Id. at 194.
57. Id. at 204-05.

58. 341 U.S. at 379.
59. The Kilbourn rationale was that the lack oi "jurisdiction" to investigate,
into the affairs of private individuals deprived congressional orders of their legitimacy.103 U.S. at 196. The implication was that where there is jurisdiction to investigate,
actions in furtherance of the investigation and not otherwise illegal are protected.
60. Since no explicit dichotomy between legislators and their agents had yet
been advanced as a principle of the immunity, there would be no justification for
holding agents liable for executing orders of their principals when their principals.
had acted legitimately in furtherance of their offices.
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Justice Black, however, perhaps realized the inconsistency between
the Tenney formulation and the rationale given in Kilbourn for imposing liability upon the executor of congressional orders. As did the
majority, he discarded the Kilbourn language of "jurisdiction" in the
Congress. The majority had stated that the protection extends to the
entire "field where legislators traditionally have power to act.""' Justice
Black explained that this immunity did not confer validity upon the
decisions which it protected, so that the judiciary would have to take a
second look at any congressional order whose execution might infringe
upon individual rights.62 The legal validity of congressional decisions,
he asserted, is not "coextensive with the personal immunity of legislators. 68 Therefore, the fact that congressional decisions are accorded
immunity did not guarantee that they would be given legal sanction
through the courts.6 4
This approach, though novel in the area of congressional immunity,
was nothing more than the theory of judicial review of congressional
legislation. 5 Justice Black simply applied that theory to decisions of
the Congress which were antecedent to the passing of the bill.
The next two speech or debate cases to reach the Supreme Court
6 and Dombrowski v. Eastland."
were United States v. Johnson"
Although Johnson was decided a year before Dombrowski, the latter
decision was factually similar to Kilbourn and Tenney, and therefore
it is appropriate to disregard strict chronological sequence and to discuss
that decision first.
The plaintiff in Dombrowski was a private citizen attacking the
investigative activities of a congressional committee.6 ' Like the citizens
in Kilbourn and Tenney, he alleged a deprivation of his constitutional
rights by the committee. 69 However, the type of right allegedly infringed differed in each of the three decisions. In Tenney, the right
61. 341 U.S. at 379.
62. Id. (Black, J., concurring).

63. Id.
64. Id. Justice Black emphasized that "holding that the chairman and other
members of his committee cannot be sued in this case is not a holding that their
alleged persecution of Brandhove is legal conduct." Id. As an example, Black noted
that in contempt proceedings Brandhove would be able to raise the defense that the
..committee's actions were void. Id. at 380.
65. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803), established the principle
ithat the courts must only give legal life to legislative enactments which are in
;accord with the Constitution. Id. at 180.
66. 383 U.S. 169 (1966).
67. 387 U.S. 82 (1967) (per curiam).
68, Id. at 83. The committee in this case was the Senate Judiciary Committee's
Internal Security Subcommittee. Id.

69. Id.
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol20/iss1/4
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violated was basically the right to one's good reputation,7" whereas in
Kilbourn the citizen plaintiff had been incarcerated for over a month. 71
In Dombrowski the private citizen's property and records had been
allegedly seized in possible violation of his fourth amendment rights.7 2
These differences in the facts of the three cases made it possible for the
Court to arrive at a different solution in each without constructing a
consistent theory of congressional immunity.
As a basis for the decision in Dombrowski, the Court had at its
disposal the confusing language of Kilbourn,8 the simple Tenney formulation, 74 and the Black theory for invalidating congressional decisions. 75 The Court chose the Tenney analysis which protected legislators as long as they were acting "in the sphere of legitimate legislative
activity. ' 76 Clearly, in Dombrowski, plaintiff's property and records
had been seized without a valid warrant.77 However, because Senator
Eastland himself did not appear to have been involved in the actual
seizure of petitioner's property, his actions were within the permissible
sphere and the Court dismissed the case as to him. 78 As to Committee
Counsel Sourwine, however, the Court decreed continuation of the case,
and presumably he could be found liable if it were subsequently found
that he personally had exceeded the sphere of legislative activity by his
70
involvement in the seizure of the papers.
The facts in both Dombrowski and Kilbourn involve physical interferences with individuals and the resolution in each case was similar:
the Congressmen were exempted but a further inquiry was ordered
into the actions of the Congressmen's agents, carrying with it the possible imposition of liability.80 However, the complicated Kilbourn
reasoning and language were avoided in Dombrowski, with no discussion of "jurisdiction" in the Congress or unnecessary challenge to its
investigative powers being undertaken. How, then, did the Court
rationalize its exemption of the Senator but not of the Senator's agent
in the matter? The Court seemed to combine the simple Tenney formulation with the Kilbourn holdings to arrive at a formula by which
70. See text accompanying note 47 supra. The limit of the legislature's inter-

ference with him was to hold him in contempt and publicly censure him since he was
never incarcerated for his actions. Id. at 371.
71. 103 U.S. at 176-77.
72. 387 U.S. at 83.
73. See text accompanying notes 25-27 supra.
74. See text accompanying note 49 supra.
75. See text accompanying notes 62-64 supra.
76. 387 U.S. at 86, quoting Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367, 376 (1951).
77. 387 U.S. at 83.
78. Id. at 84.
79. Id. at 84-85.
80. See text accompanying notes 35 & 36 and 78 & 79 supra.

Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1974

11

Villanova Law Review, Vol. 20, Iss. 1 [1974], Art. 4
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 20: p. 97

legislative immunity was "less absolute, although applicable, when applied to officers or employees of a legislative body, rather than to legislators themselves."'" Although the legislator himself was protected
under Tenney because he had not acted outside the legislative sphere,
his agent, Sourwine, apparently had been involved in activity beyond
this sphere, and hence the case would have to continue against him.
The Court did not discuss the possibility that the agent had acted pursuant to congressional orders and therefore did not consider whether
such orders would have been protected,82 or whether they would have
been constitutional or "valid." 8 Thus, while no clear theory emerged
whereby a principal's orders would be protected yet his agent's execution
thereof could not be, the Tenney formulation seemed to gain support
and the Kilbourn dichotomy between legislator and agent was retained,
although it was not possible to determine how crucial either principle
was to the result.
Despite the lack of a consistent philosophical approach, Kilbourn,
Tenney, and Dombrowski together provided a manageable rule for deciding speech or debate clause cases in which citizens claimed violation
of their constitutional rights: If the alleged violation resulted from
congressional actions such as giving orders and resolutions, conducting
investigations and calling witnesses before them, or inserting statements into the record, the case would have to be dismissed because such
activities fell within the traditional sphere of legitimate legislative activities, concerning which legislators were not to be hindered or distracted. However, when the violation alleged a more material and
tangible interference with a citizen, such as arrest or seizure of his
property, a court was bound to investigate further to see whether such
action was legitimate. If declared unconstitutional or invalid, liability
could result, as the constitutional clause could not be interpreted to
protect such illegitimate action. However, in this event, the court would
only impose liability upon the agent who executed the order, and not
upon the principal who had ordered the illegal violation of an individual's
rights. The "personal immunity of legislators," therefore, was able to
outstrip in breadth the validity of their decisions.8 4 In appropriate cases
the agents of the Congress assumed liability so as to cover the full
range of congressional decisions, including those which a court decided
81. 387 U.S. at 85.
82. Presumably, under the Kilbourn rationale, the orders would have been protected. See text accompanying notes 35 & 36 supra.
83. Presumably, they would not have been under the Black approach. See text
accompanying notes 62-64 supra.
84. 341 U.S. at 379 (1951) (Black, J., concurring).
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never should have been obeyed. This anomaly, which was the legacy
of the early cases, has yet to be fully resolved.8 5
The next speech or debate case, United States v. Johnson,86 involved no violation of a private citizen's rights, but rather alleged criminal activity by a Congressman. Defendant Johnson, a member of the
House of Representatives, was accused of having exerted influence
upon the Department of Justice in favor of a loan company which faced
indictments by that department.87 The question faced by the Supreme
Court was whether Representative Johnson's motivation in giving a
speech favorable to the loan company could be the basis of a conviction
88
under the relevant conspiracy statute.
In Tenney, the plaintiff had alleged that a committee hearing had
not been held for a " 'legislative purpose' but was designed to intimidate
and silence him."89 The Court there had rejected the claim and held
that improper motivation could not vitiate speech or debate protection,90
stating that the privilege "would be of little value" if it did not protect
Congressmen from a "judgment against them based upon a jury's
speculation as to motives.""' In contrast to Tenney, however, the
motivation alleged in Johnson derived from a transaction between a
Congressman and private interests wholly extrinsic to the legislative
activity, the giving of a speech in this case.9" The government utilized
this distinction in argument, asserting that the illegal conduct in
Johnson had been antecedent to the speech and that "the clause was
meant to prevent only prosecutions based upon the 'content' of speech." 93
The Supreme Court noted that the government had inquired at
trial into the "preparation" of the speech, its "precise ingredients," and
the "motives for giving it."94 They held that "such an intensive judicial
inquiry, made in the course of a prosecution by the Executive Branch
under a general conspiracy statute, violates the express language of the
Constitution and the policies which underlie it." 95 In effect, the Court
held that the speech or debate clause precluded questioning of a Con85. See section IIA infra for a discussion of how later courts have struggled
with the problem of the legislator-agent dichotomy.
86. 383 U.S. 169 (1966). There were seven counts alleging violation of a federal
conflict of interest statute, 18 U.S.C. § 281 (1970), and one count of conspiracy to
defraud the United States in violation of another section of the criminal code, 18
U.S.C. § 371 (1970).
87. 383 U.S. at 171.
88. Id. at 172.
89. 341 U.S. at 371.
90. See text accompanying note 50 supra.
91. 341 U.S. at 377.
92. 383 U.S. at 171-72.
93. Id. at 182.
94. Id. at 175-76.
95. Id. at 177.
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gressman concerning antecedent activities such as the preparation for
and motivation behind a speech whenever the content of the speech
was inevitably connected to those activities.96 The Johnson holding
thus implied a rejection of the government's argument that the antecedent activities and the speech itself were separable.9 7
B.

The Recent Cases

In the cases through Johnson, the Supreme Court had taken an
expansive approach in its application of the speech or debate immunity.
The language of the decisions had emphasized the importance of the
immunity to the independence of the legislature, and had evidenced a
separation of powers rationale for legislative immunity" in proclaiming
the speech or debate clause a "manifestation of the 'practical security' ""
given to the legislature against both the Executive and the Judiciary." °
The Johnson decision enlarged the scope of the protection, by including
within it activities which were not in themselves part of "speech or
debate" but were so closely intertwined with a speech that not including
them would weaken the protection afforded by the clause. 10 1 Johnson
marked a high point in the Congress' efforts to assert its immunity;
for the cases since then have tended to narrow, rather than broaden, the
construction of the clause.
Since Johnson was decided, there have been four additional Supreme Court decisions involving application of the speech or debate
clause. The first of these was Powell v. McCormack, 2 decided in 1969.
Adam Clayton Powell, although elected to the House of Representatives,
was excluded from his seat by a majority vote of the House. 0 3 Joined
by voters from his congressional district, Powell brought an action
against five members of the House, the Speaker, Clerk, Sergeant at
96. Id. at 175-77. Since the Court did not formulate a standard for the necessary
connection between the speech and the antecedent activities, one can only look at their
impression of the interconnection that existed in the instant case. Id.
97. It should be noted that the Court was very careful to point out that only
in this case could the speech not be severed from the conspiracy. Id. at 184-85. Thus,
the holding and effect of the case Was not as broad as some of the language would
lead one to believe.
98. For example, the Johnson Court stated that "[iun the American governmental
structure the clause serves the additional function of reinforcing the separation of
powers so deliberately established by the Founders." Id. at 178-79.
99. Id. at 179.
100. Id. at 181. The Court stated in Johnson that the reason for the introduction
of the speech or debate privilege into Parliament "was not only fear of the
executive ...

but of the judiciary as well." Id.

101. See text accompanying notes 94-96 supra.
102. 395 U.S. 486 (1969).
103. Id. at 489.
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Arms, and Doorkeeper of the House, charging that his exclusion by the
10 4
House had been unconstitutional.
The defendant Congressmen and House officers argued, among
other things, that the speech or debate clause precluded judicial review
of the Congressmen's decision to exclude Powell.1 °5 In order to be
able to support that claim defendants were forced to distinguish this
case from Kilbourn and Dombrowski, wherein the legislator-agent
dichotomy had enabled the Court to hurdle the speech or debate immunity argument in deciding whether to impose liability for execution
of a congressional mandate. 0 6 The defendants attempted to distinguish
those cases by contending that those cases "concerned an affirmative
act performed by the employee outside the House having a direct effect
upon a private citizen,"'10 7 whereas the instant case involved actions
taken by House employees "solely within the House."' '
Defendants' argument, however, contained several obvious weaknesses. The alignment of the Powell facts with those of Tenney, in
contrast with those of Dombrowski and Kilbourn was a tenuous one.
The exclusion of Powell from Congress was a rather tangible conceivably, even "physical" - interference with him, 0 9 which is more
readily compared with the seizure of plaintiff's papers in Dombrowski
and the arrest and incarceration in Kilbourn than with a mere verbal
attack such as was present in Tenney.
Respondents attempted to cure this deficiency by adding another
distinction: the alleged invasion of plaintiffs' rights in Dombrowski
and Kilbourn was said to be "outside the House,""' 0 while all the actions
in the instant case were admittedly within the House of Representatives. This distinction, which arguably has some validity, was simply
not present in the earlier cases. It was therefore rejected by the Court
1
without discussion.
The internal-external distinction which was put forth by the
respondents may not have been supportable in terms of the four earlier
decisions, as they argued, but it certainly elucidated a unique characteristic of the Powell case. Powell presented a situation in which the
Congress had made a decision concerning its own proper functioning.
The subject matter of the action was peculiarly within its power; it
104. Id. at 493.

105. Id. at 495.
106. See text accompanying notes 35 & 36 and 78 & 79 supra.
107. 395 U.S. at 504 (emphasis added).

108. Id.
109. In addition, it had an indirect effect upon the citizens who had elected
Powell. The restriction of their right to vote could arguably be labelled a material
or tangible interference, if not a "direct" one. See text accompanying note 113 infra.
110. 395 U.S. at 504.

111. Id.
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involved a form of self-discipline by the very branch to which was given
almost the full power to deal with abuses by government officials of
whatever branch." 2 With respect to Powell, at least, the sanction was
peculiarly nonjudicial since no right was denied to him other than his
right to sit at the 90th Congress. Therefore, it is very difficult to argue
that the legislators had in any way "usurped" the functions of either one
of the other branches.
On the other hand, the citizens who elected Powell were also
hindered in the exercise of a right - their constitutional right to vote -and the courts are generally the protectors of individual rights in our
system."' One could not argue that the case was concerned solely with
the proper functioning of Congress. The Congress' actions had had a
dual effect, one basically internal and the other external, and therefore
a rather basic separation of powers question was presented by the case.
One would have thought that this separation of powers question would
be resolved as an aspect of the speech or debate protection. The possible overlap in functions was clearly relevant to the Tenney formula
invoking protection for Congressmen acting within the "sphere of
legitimate legislative activity.""' 4 Separation of powers, as the Supreme
Court had previously stated, was at the heart of the speech or debate
clause; " 5 it was logically intrinsic to any argument dealing with the
scope of legitimate activity of one branch of government.
The Court did acknowledge the Tenney formulation".. but quickly
dismissed it, concluding that they found it necessary to treat only the
case against the employee respondents." 7 The difficult separation of
powers considerations were thus relegated to the argument upon
justiciability."'
Having excised from the argument the question of whether Congress acted within its sphere of legitimate legislative activity, the Court
found it relatively easy to deal with respondent's contention that the
speech or debate clause precluded judicial review of the congressional
decision to exclude Powell. The Court could review those legislative
112. Congress has the constitutional grant of power to impeach executive and
judicial officials. U.S. CONST. art. I, §§ 2, 3. It was also given power to "punish
its members for disorderly behavior, and with the concurrence of two thirds, expel a
member." Id. § 5. The privilege from arrest clause, on the other hand, limits the
judicial power to punish Congressmen to "treason, felony, and breach of the peace."
Id. § 6.
For a discussion of the jurisdiction of Congress to punish its own members,
see United States v. Brewster, 408 U.S. 501, 520-21 (1972).

113. See R.
114.
115.
116.
117.

BERGER, CONGRESS

v.

THE SUPREME COURT

282 (1969).

See text accompanying notes 45, 48 & 49 supra.
United States v. Johnson, 383 U.S. 169, 182 (1966).
395 U.S. at 501.
Id. at 501-02.

118. Id. at 516-17.
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acts in considering the case against House employees since Kilbourn
and Dombrowski stood for that very proposition. 9 The Court was
not troubled by this indirect way of questioning legislators for actions
which - they seemed to admit - could be considered "speech or
debate." To preclude judicial review was simply not the purpose of the
clause. 2 ° The Court concluded: "Freedom of legislative activity and
the purposes of the Speech or Debate Clause are fully protected if
legislators are relieved of the burden of defending themselves."''
As in Dombrowski, the Court in Powell, while endorsing the legislator-agent dichotomy, did not offer an explanation of that theory.
However, the Court did suggest a new understanding of the clause
by asserting that protecting legislators from having to defend themselves was the paramount purpose of the clause.' 2 This implied a
personal theory of the protection, that is, one which excluded the application of speech or debate so as to render unreviewable certain decisions
of the Congress. This principle had not been proclaimed before Powell,
nor was it clarified further in the Powell opinion. Conceivably, the
Court was substituting it for the simple legislator-agent distinction as
the mode of justifying the imposition of liability upon those executing
congressional orders while protecting the Congressmen themselves.
Perhaps it was simply a restatement of that distinction. However one
construes it, it was clear that the Court had retained the dichotomy
between a legislator and his agent as a working principle while avoiding
the problems posed by the language of the cases that first established it.
In the summer of 1972 the Court decided two more speech or
debate cases, United States v. Brewster'23 and Gravel v. United
States. 24 The facts in Brewster were very similar to those of Johnson;
both were criminal prosecutions of Congressmen accused of taking
money in return for some legislative action on behalf of a private interest.125 In observing the change in the Court's approach since
Johnson, it is useful to contrast that decision with the resolution of
Brewster.

119. 395 U.S. at 504-06.
120. Id. at 505.

121. Id.
122. Id.
123. 408 U.S. 501 (1972),
124. 408 U.S. 606 (1972).
125. The legislative activity in Brewster was the use of influence upon the Senator's
decision of how to vote upon pending legislation. 408 U.S. at 502-03. The legislative
act in Johnson was a speech. 383 U.S. at 172 (see text accompanying note 88 supra).
Yet, the two are admittedly protected activities, and the lack of precise similarity did
appear toUniversity
be of significance
in the School
two decisions.
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Former Senator Daniel Brewster was charged with soliciting and
accepting a bribe in violation of federal statutes. 2 The indictment
charged that Brewster, a member of the Senate Post Office and Civil
Service Committee, had been influenced by a bribe in his actions upon
legislation proposing changes in postal rates.'
The facts once again
posed the question of whether the speech or debate clause precluded
questioning of a Congressman concerning a transaction which allegedly
affected his motivation in making a legislative decision. In Johnson, the
Court had connected a similar bribery transaction to the giving of a
speech and had extended protection to the combination of the two activ2
ities, despite the government's contention that the two were separable. 1 1
Nevertheless, in Brewster the Court was able to separate the bribery
from the legislative activity and to conclude that the speech or debate
clause would not shield Brewster from prosecution upon the bribery
1 29
charges.
The crux of the Court's argument, by which the separation was
achieved, is found in its statement that an inquiry into the purpose of
a bribe " 'does not draw in question the legislative acts of the defendant
member of Congress or his motives for performing them.' "'30 One
can logically argue, however, that an inquiry into the purpose for a
bribe which is allegedly designed to affect certain legislative acts automatically throws doubt upon the proper motives of the Congressman
who is alleged to have performed them. Therefore, the Court may have
126. 18 U.S.C. § 201(c) (1970) provides in pertinent part:
Whoever, being a public official . . .directly or indirectly, corruptly asks,
demands, exacts, solicits, seeks, accepts, receives, or agrees to receive anything
of value for himself or any other person or entity, in return for:
(1)being influenced in his performance of any official act . . . [shall be
guilty of an offense].
Id.
18 U.S.C. § 201 (g) (1970) provides in pertinent part:
Whoever, being a public official .. . directly or indirectly asks, demands,
exacts, solicits, seeks, accepts, receives or agrees to receive anything of value
for himself for or because of any official act performed or to be performed by
him ... [shall be guilty of an offense].
Id.
18 U.S.C. § 201(a) (1970) provides:
For the purposes of this section:
"public officials" means Member of Congress....
"official act" means any decision
suit, proceeding or controversy,
which may by law be brought
capacity, or in his place of trust or

or action on any question, matter, cause,
which may at any time be pending, or
before any public official, in his official
profit.

Id.
127.
128.
129.
130.

408 U.S. at 502-03.
See text accompanying notes 93-97 supra.
408 U.S. at 526, 528.
Id. at 526, quoting United States v. Johnson, 383 U.S. 169, 185 (1966).
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol20/iss1/4
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defined "drawing in question" to mean merely directly asking one why
he performed a particular act.
Even in light of the fine distinction the Court may have drawn
in Brewster, it.is not at all clear whether the decision can be reconciled
with Johnson. The dissenting opinion of Justice Brennan asserted that
Johnson hadbeen as much as overruled. 131 Justice White, in his dissent,
viewed the Brewster facts as presenting the very situation which was
specifically left open by Johnson :132
[W] hether an otherwise impermissible prosecution conducted pursuant to a statute . . . specifically including congressional conduct
and purporting to be an exercise of congressional power to dis- would be consistent with the Speech or
cipline its Members
33
Debate Clause.1
However, recognizing that the majority did not view the facts in this
way,13 1 Justice White interpreted the majority's position as resting
upon a distinction "between promise and performance" of a legislative
act. 135 Since prosecution under the statutes relied upon by the government required as it did in Johnson, that one connect the "promise" and
the "performance,""' 6 Justice White found that Johnson dictated a
3
holding in Brewster contrary to that reached by the majority. 1
In fact, the Court in Brewster thought that the crime had been
complete upon acceptance of the bribe and thus there need not have
been such a close connection between promise and performance of the
legislative act. In the majority's view, it was not sufficient, nor would
it have been so in Johnson, to assert that the subject matter of the
131. 408 U.S. at 550 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Brennan felt the majority was
"turning its back on" Johnson and that the Court's holding repudiated "principles
of legislative freedom developed over the past century in a line of decisions culminating
in Johnson." Id. at 532.
132. United States v. Johnson, 383 U.S. 169, 185 (1966).
133. 408 U.S. at 562-63 (White, J., dissenting).
134. The majority did not address the congressional self-regulation argument, id.
at 529 n.18, despite the fact that this was the principal ground upon which the
prosecution justified the statutes and the conviction. Id. at 530-31 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting).
135. Id. at 552.
136. Id. at 553-55.
137. Id. at 553. The Justice stated that in order to prove the crime in Johnson:
[Tihe prosecution introduced evidence that money was paid to make a speech,
among other things, and that the speech was made. This, the Court held, violated
the Speech or Debate Clause, because it called into question the motives and
purposes underlying Congressman Johnson's performance of his legislative duties.
The same infirmity inheres in the present indictment ....
Id.
Justice White was also concerned with the language of the indictment which
charged Brewster with illegality in relation to "'his action, vote and decision on
postage rate legislation.'" Id. at 553. This is exactly the kind of charge against
which White thought the speech or debate clause was designed to protect. Id.
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inquiry was "related" to the motivation for the legislative act.""8 Many
legislative activities are casually or incidentally "related" to the legislative process but the speech or debate clause does not protect such
actions.' 3 9 While not making clear how closely related to a valid legislative act an activity had to be in order to come under the protection,
the majority held that "inquiry into illegal conduct" was not protected
"simply because it has some nexus to legislative functions. "140 Thus
the inquiry into the alleged promise to perform certain official acts was
characterized as simply having "some nexus" to the actual motives of
the officer when he subsequently performed those acts. Perhaps Johnson
was not thereby overruled, but at the very least it was adroitly
141
ignored.
In any event, the significance of Brewster may not lie in its holding
upon the specific facts presented, but rather in its general approach to
the speech or debate clause which Justice White characterized as a
"begrudging interpretation.' 42 Various ordinary activities of a legislator were characterized as "political in nature rather than legislative."
Among these were "legitimate 'errands' performed for constituents, the
making of appointments with Government agencies, assistance in
securing Government contracts, preparing so-called 'newsletters' to
constituents, news releases, and speeches delivered outside the Congress.' 43 No one had ever seriously contended, proclaimed the Court,
that these "political matters . . . . have the protection afforded by the
Speech or Debate Clause.' 44 They also formulated a new standard
138. Id. at 528.
139. Id.
140. Id. As an example of related unprotected activity, the Court noted that in
Johnson, the Congressman could have been retried upon the conspiracy count if
evidence concerning his speech were not admitted. The majority felt that upon retrial,
Johnson "could not have obtained immunity from prosecution by asserting that the
matter being inquired into was related to the motivation for his House Speech." Id.
141. The Brewster Court attempted to distinguish Johnson by saying that it had
merely held inadmissible the inquiry into the motivation and performance of the
legislative acts themselves, id. at 512, which inquiry would also be precluded in
Brewster. Id. at 525. The implication was that the deficiency in Johnson was the
Government's attempt to prove too much. But this treatment of the Johnson holding
as a rule of evidentiary law is belied by the language there. In Johnson the Court
had stated :
The constitutional infirmity infecting this prosecution is not merely a matter
of the introduction of inadmissible evidence. The attention given to the speech's
substance and motivation was not an incidental part of the Government's case,
which might have been avoided by omitting certain lines of questioning or
excluding certain evidence.
383 U.S. at 176-77.
142. 408 U.S. at 562 (White, J., dissenting).
143. Id. at 512. It is unclear whether the Court was including this list of
"political" activities in the category of related legislative acts which were not
protected (see text accompanying notes 138-40 supra), or whether political acts are a
category unto themselves which are not immune.
144. Id.
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for legislative immunity; henceforth only "purely legislative activities"
45
would be protected by the speech or debate clause.
The decision in United States v. Gravel 4 ' added some substance
to the new "purity" standard proposed in Brewster. Senator Gravel used
his chairmanship of the Senate Public Works Subcommittee to read
into a committee record various portions of the "Pentagon Papers." ' 47
Subsequently, he made arrangements for publishing the entire record
through a private publishing house in Boston, presumably in order to
obtain a more general audience for the information contained in the
Papers.14 The Government, in order to discover the means by which
the Senator was able to acquire the Papers,"'4 convened a grand jury
in Boston and subpoenaed an aide of the Senator for questioning.15 0
Senator Gravel intervened and moved to quash the subpoena, claiming
that the speech or debate clause protected his aide from any questioning
upon the matter.'
Acting upon this novel set of facts, the Court held
that aides and assistants of legislators are entitled to speech or debate
protection equal to that given to the legislator himself,15 2 so long as
the aide acts within the scope of employment; that private republication
of material is not a protected legislative act ;153 and that the legislator
and his aide could be questioned about sources of information, if such
inquiry were relevant to an investigation of possible third-party crime. '
With regard to the immunity afforded to the Congressman's aide,
it can be argued that the Gravel Court rendered an expansive interpretation of the speech or debate clause. Recognizing that the day-to-day
work of Congressmen requires them to delegate a great deal of authority
to their aides and assistants, the Court included such employees under
the immunity whenever they did things "which would have been legislative acts, and therefore privileged," if performed by the Congressmen
themselves. 5 5
145. Id. at 512, 528.
146. 408 U.S. 606 (1972).
147. Id. at 609.
148. Id. at 609-10.
149. Id. at 608. The government was investigating a variety of possible criminal
offenses, including:
the retention of public property or records with intent to convert, the gathering
and transmitting of national defense information, the concealment or removal of
public records or documents, and conspiracy to commit such offenses and to
defraud the United States.
Id. (citations omitted).
150. Id. at 608-09.
151. Id.
152. Id. at 618, 621-22.
153. Id. at 625-27.
154. Id. at 628.
Id. atUniversity
616, quoting United States v. Doe, 332 F. Supp. 930, 937-38 (D. Mass.
Published by155.
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Interestingly, the Court was compelled to take this view by its
own previous stand in the area of official immunity. This immunity,
which applies particularly to executive branch officials, had been held
to protect not only Cabinet-rank officers, but also officers of lower rank
in the Barr v. Mateo1" 6 decision. The legislator-agent dichotomy would
have been still more anomalous if it were retained with respect to congressional immunity, which is constitutionally guaranteed, even though
no officer-aide dichotomy was admitted with respect to official immunity, which is court-created. The Court may or may not have seen a
legislator-aide distinction in Gravel as an anomaly. Yet for one reason
or another it did away with it, agreeing with the court of appeals that
for the purpose of the privilege, a Congressman and his aide should be
1
"treated as one.'

57

Having established the principle that the legislator and his aide
were entitled to coextensive immunities, the Court defined the scope of
that protection. Justice White, writing for the Court, stated that the
privilege precluded "prosecutions that directly impinge upon or threaten
the legislative process."' 5 8 This general definition initially appeared
consistent with those developed in the earlier cases, since "legislative
process" did not sound much different from the "sphere of legitimate
legislative activity" protected in Tenney.1 59 However, the Justice went
on to define "legislative process" in an unprecedented manner. The
clause, he said, protected "speech or debate in either House"; insofar
as it protects other matters,
[Tlhey must be an integral part of the deliberative and communicative processes by which Members participate in committee and
House proceedings with respect to the consideration and passage
or rejection of proposed legislation or with respect to other matters
which the Constitution places within the jurisdiction of either
House. 6 o
This formulation of the privilege linked the "deliberate and
communicative processes" and other constitutionally prescribed action.' 61 By implication, those aspects of the communicative process
156. 360 U.S 564, 572-74 (1959).
157. 408 U.S. at 616, quoting United States v. Doe, 455 F.2d 753, 761 (1st Cia
1972).
158. 408 U.S. at 616.
159. See text accompanying notes 45, 48 & 49 supra.
160. 408 U.S. at 625.
161. The wording includes under the protection "deliberative and communicative
processes" which are part of either (a) "consideration and passage or rejection of
proposed legislative," or (b) "other matters which the Constitution places within the
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol20/iss1/4
jurisdiction of either House." Id. at 625.
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which were not directly concerned with a piece of legislation or other
constitutionally prescribed action were not accorded protection. 0 2 Similarly, other aspects of the legislative process which were not essentially
communicative or deliberate in nature were excluded. 0 3 This formulation was unquestionably narrower than that of the early cases. Its
application to Gravel provided further proof of this assertion.
The Court employed this new formula to determine which actions
by Gravel and his aide were entitled to protection. The Senator's arrangements for publication were not accorded any protection, since this
activity was not considered "part and parcel of the legislative process."'0 4
Neither would the manner by which the Senator obtained the documents
qualify as a legislative act; therefore no protection was extended to
anyone concerning his acquisition of materials for the committee meeting, "as long as the questions [did] not implicate legislative action of
the Senator."'0 5 With respect to other aspects of the preparation and
implementation of the various legislative acts, the Court held that both
the Congressman and his aide could be questioned and declared liable
for any acts violating "an otherwise valid criminal law." '
In effect,
the Court limited the speech or debate immunity to that aspect of a
Congressman's work which one could characterize as the passing of a
bill. 0
The only other protected actions' were activities intimately
connected to that process, such as communications between Senator and
aide "related" to the legislative process, as the Court defined that process.'0 8 It was obvious that Justice White had applied his own formulation faithfully.
The dissenting justices in Gravel were quick to point out that the
majority was almost completely ignoring what may be characterized
as the informing function of Congress. Justice Douglas saw this case
as representing the struggle by the Congress to inform itself, in the
face of executive branch efforts to keep secret great amounts of information.'
In this type of struggle, while he believed the courts had no
place, 7 ° he nonetheless thought that the speech or debate clause should
162. General communications with constituents may be examples of such actions.
163. Acquisition of information from the executive might be one example.

164. 408 U.S. at 626.
165. Id. at 628.
166. Id. at 626. The Court in referring to an "otherwise valid criminal law"
meant a law which did not punish those functions protected by the speech or debate
clause, i.e., voting, speech, or other legislative activities. Id.
167. Id. at 649 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
168. Id. at 629.
169. 408 U.S. at 637-46 (Douglas, J.,dissenting).
170. Id. at 639-40. The Justice stated:
It is, however, no concern of the courts, as i see it, how a document is stamped
in an Executive Department or whether a committee of Congress can obtain
Published by Villanova
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operate to immunize a Congressman insofar as his actions were "normally done by a member 'in relation to the business' " before the Congress.' 7 ' Further, protection of the informing function in this case
required that the republication by Senat6r Gravel be brought under the
speech or debate clause, and that the "confidences of the Senator in
arranging it not [be] subject to inquiry 'in any other Place' than the
1' 7 2
Congress.'
Justice Brennan, with whom Justices Douglas and Marshall joined
in dissent, focused upon the heart of the problem in his discussion of
the majority's indifference to the informing function.1 7 8 He stated that
the explanation for the Court's "anomalous" treatment of that function,
by which "words spoken in debate or written in congressional reports
[were] protected" yet the attempt to seek "a wider audience" through
republication was not, 174 lay in the Court's restrictive definition of the
legislative processes encompassing "only acts necessary to the internal
deliberations of Congress concerning proposed legislation.' 1 75 This
definition "excludes from the sphere of protected activity" the duty to
inform the general public, which duty Brennan believed to be "at the
17
heart of our democratic system.' 6
The broader approach that Brennan proposed also led him to protect
from inquiry the source of the documents which Senator Gravel introduced into the record.' 7 7 Brennan justified this by asserting that the
"receipt of materials for use in a congressional hearing is an integral
part of the preparation for that legislative act."' 7 8 Protected activities:
such as speeches, hearings, and the casting of votes require research
and preparation, 1 7 and such antecedent undertakings are irrevocably
connected to the legislative acts themselves.' 0 In Brennan's own words:
It would accomplish little toward the goal of legislative freedom to exempt an official act from intimidating scrutiny, if other
conduct leading up to the act and intimately related to it could be
deterred by a similar threat."8 '
the use of it. The federal courts do not sit as an ombudsman, refereeing the
disputes between the other two branches.

Id.
171. Id. at 635, quoting Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U.S. 168, 204 (1881).

172. 408 U.S. at 637.
173. Id. at 649-62 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
174. Id. at 649.
175. Id.

176. Id.
177. Id. at 663. Justice Brennan felt that if any branch of the government should
be empowered to inquire into congressional sources, it should only be Congress itself.

Id. at 663-64.

178. Id. at 662.
179. Id. at 662-63.

180. Id.

https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol20/iss1/4
181. Id. at 663.
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In one sense, the Gravel and Brewster cases completed a stage
which anticipated the drama of conflicting forces represented by Doe v.
McMillan.'12 Doe took the most difficult elements of the entire speech
or debate question and combined them into one case. It presented basic
separation of powers issues, as well as a classic conflict between the
needs of a governmental branch and the rights of innocent individuals.
The plaintiffs in Doe were students in the District of Columbia
whose names had appeared in a report of the House's District of Columbia Committee. The complaint alleged that the report contained
derogatory information- about the plaintiff students."'3 Cited as defendants in the suit were the Chairman, members and staff of the
Committee, the Superintendent of Documents, the Public Printer, and
certain officials of the District's public school system.8
The question
faced by the Supreme Court was formulated by Justice White, who
wrote the majority opinion, as being "whether the Speech or Debate
Clause affords absolute immunity from private suits to persons who,
with authorization from Congress, distribute materials which allegedly
infringe upon the rights of individuals."'18 5 A divided Court answered
this question in the negative, holding that the speech or debate clause
did not protect the execution of the congressional orders, although those
orders were themselves given protection.'8 0
Thus the Court thought that the primary actions of the Committee
in this case, that is, the authorization of the hearings, the preparation
of the report, and the order to publish the report were within the protection of the clause 8 7 as interpreted by Gravel.'" However, those same
protected orders by the Congressmen had been transformed into "nonlegislative directives"'8 9 the moment the Committee ordered publication
beyond what Justice White termed "the reasonable bounds of the legislative task."' 90 Outside this boundary, the protection did not exempt
anyone from liability, just as it had not protected the Sergeant at Arms
in his execution of congressional orders which the Court had "subse182. 412 U.S. 306 (1973).
183. Id. at 308. Specifically, the information was in the form of attendance lists,
disciplinary letters and memoranda, test papers, and other school documents. Id.
184. Id. at 309.
185. Id. at 314.
186. Id. at 315-16.
187. Id. at 313. The primary actions in Doe were:
The acts of authorizing an investigation pursuant to which the subject materials
were gathered, holding hearings where the materials were presented, preparing
a report where they were reproduced, and authorizing the publication and
distribution of that report. . ..

Id.
188. See text accompanying note 160 supra.
189. 412 U.S. at 315.
190. Id.
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quently found to be 'without authority' " in Kilbourn.'0' The Court

considered public distribution "beyond the apparent needs of the 'due
functioning of the [legislative] process' " to be separable from the
internal distribution to. Members of Congress. 1 2 The general dissemination of the report could thus be reviewed and anyone involved
in it held liable, even though the internal distribution was protected by
speech or debate. 9
No new formula was propounded to achieve this particular dichotomy in the normal functioning of the legislature; rather the notion
of a "legislative sphere" to which protection would extend was retained." 4 Moreover, the Court admitted that it had "no authority to
oversee the judgment of the Committee" within that sphere or to impose
liability upon the Congressmen should the Court disagree with the
Committee's "legislative judgment."' 9 5 The general publication of a
report was simply held to be outside that legislative sphere - to be
"nonlegislative" - because the Court believed it to go "beyond the
reasonable requirements of the legislative function."'9 0
Crucial to the Doe holding is the Court's ability to review the
reasonableness of a legislative act such as the decision to print a particular number of committee reports. 9 7 The decision thus furthers the
Powell notion that the purpose of the speech or debate immunity is not
to preclude judicial review of legislative actions,"" but rather to assure
Congressmen that they will not be held personally answerable for certain
decisions they make.
Under the Doe-Gravel approach, there is no difference between a
Congressman and his assistant as long as either one performs the protected legislative actions.199 It may be presumed, although there are no
cases which establish the rule, that a Congressman who undertook
personally to execute congressional orders to a point beyond the reason191. Id.. quoting Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U.S. 168, 200 (1881).
192. 412 U.S. at 317, quoting United States v. Brewster, 408 U.S. 501, 516 (1972).
193. Id. at 315-17.
194. Id. at 312, quoting Gravel v. United States, 408 U.S. 606, 624-25 (1972).
195. Id. at 313.
196. Id. at 316.
197. Id. The dissection of the legislature's functioning according to judicial
opinion as to the "reasonable requirements" is troublesome since it forces a doctrine
which presumably protects the independence of one branch to depend upon another
branch's interpretation of how reasonably it has acted. Arguably, this is no more
threatening to the autonomy of the legislative branch than are the determinations
the judiciary has made in the past pursuant to its task of determining whether an
activity should be held to be a legislative act or to be within the legislative process.
However, the requirement of reasonableness, in addition to the necessity of finding a
legislative act, seems to allow the Court a wider scope and deeper incursion in its
review of acts of legislators.
198. See text accompanying notes 120-121 supra.
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol20/iss1/4
199. See text accompanying notes 152-53 supra.
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able requirements defined in Doe could be held liable for his actions.20 0
For certain actions, which the Court considers essential to the legislative
process, such as the internal deliberations and communications between
Congressmen, no one may be held liable, regardless of status or office.
For all other acts, anyone can incur liability. In this way the doctrine
of congressional immunity has regained the logical consistency of which
it had been deprived by the legislator-agent dichotomy of the early cases.
However, this gain has been more than offset by a narrowing in scope
of the protected activities. 0 1 It is submitted that this narrow approach
by the Court represents a disregard for the Congress' informing function which belies the theory of the separation of powers and its practical
guarantee in article I, section 6.
III.
A.

A LOOK

AT EXISTING APPROACHES

The Legislator-Agent Dichotomy

In the early cases the notion of a legislator-agent dichotomy in the
application of the speech or debate clause was evident in the Court's
language, and to a certain extent in the holdings of the cases. 20 2 This
concept received its most explicit endorsement in the Dombrowski decision, wherein the Court stated that legislative immunity "is less
absolute, although applicable, when applied to officers or employees of
a legislative body, rather than to legislators themselves.

2

1

3

Although

the recent cases apparently have narrowed the distinction, at least
theoretically,2" 4 the use of the legislator-agent dichotomy in Kilbourn,
200. There is language in Doe that expresses this view. The majority stated that:
A Member of Congress may not with impunity publish a libel from the speaker's
stand in his home district, and clearly the Speech or Debate Clause would not
protect such an act even though the libel was read from an official committee
report.
412 U.S. at 314 (footnote omitted).
201. See text accompanying notes 142, 160-64 and 189-93 supra.
202. See text accompanying notes 35 & 36, 58 & 59, 78 & 79 supra for a discussion
of the Kilbovrn, Tenney, and Dombrowski decisions where the importance of the
legislator-agent distinction in the early cases is discussed.
203. Dombrowski v. Eastland, 387 U.S. 82, 85 (1967) (per curiam).
204. In Gravel it was rejected to the extent that a Congressman and his aide
were held indistinguishable for purposes of the immunity. United States v. Gravel,
408 U.S. 606, 616 (1972).
In Doe the language of the opinion indicated that the distinction had limited
conceptual validity in that liability depends upon the type of activity from which the
suit arises, not upon the person who acted. Doe v. McMillan, 412 U.S. 306, 312-16
(1973). Additionally, the Court said:
Congressmen and aides are absolutely immune when they are legislating. But
when they act outside the "sphere of legitimate legislative activity" they enjoy
no special immunity ....
Id. at
(citations
omitted).
Published
by 324
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Dombrowski, and Powell ' bears closer scrutiny because the question
of liability is very closely related to the important issue of the Congress'
accountability to the courts for decisions it makes.
In every speech or debate case there are two very difficult questions
posed: First, are the Congressman's actions reviewable by a court?
For certain actions, the very existence of the speech or debate clause
requires that a reason be given for allowing judicial review since the
clause presumably protects those activities of a Congressman from
being "questioned in any other Place. ' 20 6 Second, are the courts able to
impose liability upon someone for the actions under attack once it is
decided that no protection is afforded by the clause? The two questions
are, of course, interrelated. They may indeed be so interrelated as
actually to be elements of the same issue and thus depend upon the same
findings and conclusions. What the legislator-agent dichotony has
done is to preclude any clear definition of the relationship between the
two questions.
The Kilbourn rationale is perhaps the most unclear. At times it
seemed that liability resulted from reviewability; that is, since the
Congressmen had acted ultra vires their office, the Court could review
their actions, find their actions unconstitutional, and impose liability
upon their agents.2"7 At other times, reviewability seemed to follow
a fortiori from the imposition of liability upon the sergeant at arms.
In other words, the speech or debate clause did not preclude questioning
of Congress' agents; and in order to determine the liability of the agent,
one must review the legitimacy of his actions and, hence, the congressional power to order those actionssOs
The Court in Kilbourn found the House's investigation illegitimate
because in its view the purpose thereof was non-legislative..2 " The facile
nmanner in which it did this implied that the Court generally could review any congressional activity to determine if its purpose was proper.
However, the Court also decided that the congressional orders and
resolutions were within the protection of the clause, and this meant that
the Congressmen could not be questioned in "any other Place" about
their orders' propriety. 210 Fortunately for the Court in that case there
205. In these three cases the holdings have distinguished the Congressmen from
the officials who executed their orders. The rationale has not always been clear.
See text accompanying notes 35 & 36, 81-84, 121 & 122 supra, and notes 207-14 infra.
206. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6.
207. Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U.S. 168, 190-96 (1881).
208. Id. at 196-200.
209. Id. at 194-96.
210. Id. at 201-03. However, the Court explicitly left open the question of whether
"an utter perversion of a [Congressman's] powers to a criminal purpose would be
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol20/iss1/4
protected from punishment by [the Speech or Debate Clause]." Id. at 205.
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were others available for questioning concerning those actions. Review of
the decisions was, therefore, possible without violating the literal wording of the clause, which clearly proscribed questioning of the Congressmen themselves. The Court's ability to review, which seemed to exist
independent of the question of liability, in fact depended upon the circumstance of an agent's being available for questioning and having
liability imposed upon him. Therefore, the result was that certain actions were held to be outside the Congress' "jurisdiction" yet within
the protection of the immunity, "not to be questioned" and yet reviewable by the courts.
The relationship between reviewability and liability under the
clause was approached more courageously in the Powell decision.
There the Court made the sweeping assertion that the purpose of the
speech or debate protection "is not to forestall judicial review of legislative action but to insure that legislators are not distracted from or
hindered in the performance of their legislative tasks by being called into
court to defend their actions." 2 '1 Once again, however, the legislatoragent dichotomy and the availability of the agents obviated the need to
question 212 the legislators themselves. Although implying that reviewthat the justifiability was not in issue, the Court felt compelled to state
21
cation for reviewability was the liability of the agent.
In arriving at its decision, the Powell Court ignored the Tennev
standard by which Congressmen acting in the "sphere of legitimate
2 14
legislative activity" were protected by speech or debate immunity.
It did not determine whether the House, in its exclusion of Powell,
had acted within that sphere. As a consequence, the Court avoided the
troublesome problem of precisely distinguishing between reviewable
legislative actions and protected legislative actions.
As noted above, in the Gravel and Doe decisions, the Court apparently abolished any distinction based solely upon the status of the
individual who executes the congressional order. However, neither the
Gravel case nor the Doe case completely abolished the Kilbourn rationale. In Doe, for example, the Court held the Congressmen's orders
and votes to be immune, but did not "insulate" the agents who executed
211. Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 505 (1969).
212. The Court cited Kilbourn and Dombrowski, for the proposition that dismissing
a suit against a Member of Congress, because of the restrictions of the speech or
debate clause, did not bar review of the "challenged congressional action [where]
congressional cuployces were also sued." Id. at 505-06 (emphasis added).
213. Id. at 503-06. See note 212 supra.
214. Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367 (1951).
45, 48 & 49 supra.

See text accompanying notes
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those orders.21 As a justification for the different treatment accorded
to the agents, it was explained that Kilbourn stood for the proposition
that such agents were not protected ipso facto because they had been
following a legislative command.216 It is unfortunate that the Court
relied upon Kilbourn in any way as a basis for decision in Doe and
Gravel, since this cast a shadow of Kilbourn confusion upon the principles to be applied in the speech or debate area.
Viewed within the umbra of Kilbourn, Doe and Gravel could
be interpreted to mean that there is no legislator-agent distinction where
the agent is an "aide" of the Congressman, but that more remote,
ministerial agents are not equally protected. The Public Printer and
Superintendent of Documents in Doe could thus be considered to have
been remote -

and hence, unprotected -

agents, while Gravel's legis-

lative aide could consistently be thought of as having shared in the
Congressman's protection. This would concord with the imposition of
liability in Kilbourn, where the agent was not a congressional aide privy
to the legislators' process of decisionmaking but an officer with a more
ministerial kind of responsibility.
However, it is unlikely that this interpretation is correct, and certainly it is not desirable. Doe and Gravel can better be explained in
terms of the nature of the activities which were challenged, rather than
in those of the statuses of the actors. Those cases have defined protected
legislative activity as that which is intimately connected with the passage
of a bill. This definition of the scope of protected activity necessarily
favors the aide, who generally is involved in the enacting of legislation,
over the more remote agent who prints reports or otherwise executes
congressional orders. To propose, as was implied in the language of
Kilbourn and Dombrowski, that a distinction be made purely upon the
basis of the defendant's office leads to a very confusing theory of immunity, as it violates the logic of the agency relationship since it holds
the agent responsible for what the principal has ordered, often in situations where neither the agent nor the principal could know in advance
that the challenged action would be declared illegitimate.
B.

The Internal-External Distinction

Apart from the legislator-agent dichotomy, an expedient, if not a
principle, used by the Court in the cases, a distinction has also been
made between what one might call the "internal" and the "external"
215. 412 U.S. at 315.
216. Id.

https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol20/iss1/4

30

Suarez: Congressional Immunity: A Criticism of Exisiting Distinctions and
NOVEMBER,

1974]

CONGRESSIONAL IMMUNITY

activities of a legislator.117 Under the theory of this distinction, protection extends to activities of Congress which are
part of the deliberative and communicative processes by which
Members participate in Committee and House proceedings with
respect to the consideration and passage or rejection of proposed
legislation or with respect to other matters which
2 18 the Constitution
places within the jurisdiction of either House,
but not to other actions of the Congressmen.21 9
There are two major problems with this definition. Initially, it
seems to preclude protection of activities as crucial to the legislative
function as the Congressmen's efforts to inform themselves, the activity
Gravel seemed to immunize. Narrowing the immunity to allow aides
to be questioned about the sources of information necessarily impedes
the flow of information to the Congress. It does not help to protect
the "deliberative and communicative processes" by which Congressmen
enact legislation when there is little information to communicate or
deliberate upon, especially at a time when the flow of information from
the Executive is being deliberately impeded. Thus, it is imperative that
the Congress be protected in its efforts to acquire information. 2
At the other end of the legislative process, the lack of protection
for the continuing flow of information is equally devastating. A Congressman communicates with his constituents in numerous ways, all of
which are means of maintaining a close relationship between a repre22 1
sentative and those he represents.

217. Doe exemplified the internal-external distinction as distribution of a committee
report within the halls of Congress was protected but its dissemination to the public
was not. Id. at 315-17.
218. United States v. Gravel, 408 U.S. 606, 625 (1972).
219. In dictum, the Brewster Court listed some activities that it felt were not
within the scope of the protection. United States v. Brewster, 408 U.S. 501, 512
(1972). See text accompanying note 143 supra.
220. The seriousness of this clog in the pipeline of information which runs from
the Executive to the Congress and the people can hardly be overstated. The Congress
has a very difficult time obtaining necessary information from the Executive's
labyrinths and must often be satisfied with whatever information the Executive wishes
to make available. Even when a Member of Congress manages to find out that a
certain report exists and that it contains information of vital importance to the
legislature and the people, he is often unable to call high-level executive officials
for questioning with regard to such a report, as the Congressman will first have
to overcome the official's claim of executive privilege. See M. J. GREEN, J. FALLOWS &
D. SwIcx, WHO RUNS CONGRESS? 102-30 (1972).
221. The Court seems to have excised from the legislature most if not all of
the existing means of communicating with constituents. Certainly all nonofficial
or noninstitutional modes of passing information are excluded by the Brewster "purity"
standard, which would classify them as "political" rather than "legislative." See text
accompanying note 143 supra. Official reports and the Congressional Record, on the
other hand, would seem to come within the protection, being "legislative" rather
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One aspect of a Congressman's informing function, which we may
term the "watchdog" function, is totally separate from his function as
a lawmaker. It concerns, for the most part, the discovery of how the
executive machinery is functioning and the transmission of that information to the people. Former President Wilson placed this aspect of
the informing function upon an equal level with that of the lawmaking function when he said: "Quite as important as legislation is
vigilant oversight of administration."222
A second aspect of the informing function, however, is a part of
the legislative function, not an adjunct to it. In this sense, the duty to
inform is an integral element of the representative's own role, not a
result of his ancillary "watchdog" role. The flow of information from
Congressman to constituent is important not only because it keeps the
constituent informed of the Executive's implementation of measures
decided upon by the Congress, but also because this communication is
the soul of the representative process itself. The subject of the communication is not what the Executive is doing but what the Congress
is thinking. 223 President Wilson envisioned this aspect of the informing
function as a give-and-take of opinions and facts between legislators
and their electorates. This he placed upon a higher level than the
"legislative," lawmaking function itself: "[E]ven more important than
legislation," he asserted, "is the instruction and guidance in political
affairs which the people might receive from a body which kept all
national concerns suffused in a broad daylight of discussion." 2'24 Viewed

than "political." But even as to these, the Doe decision seemed to restrict both
formal and informal modes of communicating with the general public by subjecting
them to judicial scrutiny. See text accompanying notes 189-93 supra.
222. W. WILSON, CONGRESSIONAL GOVERNMENT 195 (1885) (hereinafter cited as
WILSON). President Wilson emphasized the importance of this aspect of a Congressman's duties, saying:

If the people could have, through Congress, daily knowledge of all the more
important transactions of the governmental offices, an insight into all that now
seens withheld and private, their confidence in the executive now so often shaken,
would, I think, be very soon established.

Id. at 196.
223. Like the courts, the Congress analyzes a factual situation and develops a
legal solution for the "cases" it decides upon. Judge Landis made use of this judicial
analogy in explaining the importance of the communication between a representative
and his constituents:
The electorate demands a presentation of the case; it requires, even though its
comprehension be limited by its capacity, the chaos from which its representative
has claimed to have evolved the order that betokens progress. The very fact of
representative government thus burdens the legislature with this informing
function.

Landis, Constitutional Limitations on the Congressional Power of Investigation,
40 HARV. L. Rev. 153, 205-06 (1926) (emphasis added).
224. WILSON, supra note 222, at 195.
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol20/iss1/4
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in this manner, it is clear that the very nature of representation precludes a simple division of the legislative process into internal and
external activities. In a representative system, the process of debate
and the exchange of ideas is either both internal and external, or nonexistant. Speech or debate protection achieves nothing if it cannot
protect the communications between the Congress and the people. This
''representative" aspect of the informing function is contradicted by
the internal-external dichotomy as applied in Doe, for here the completion of the congressional action of publishing a report is negated,
since the distribution of that report is limited to the "internal" needs of
22
the Congress and thus denied to an extent to the general public. 5
The decision to publish a report implies the existence of a desire to
communicate with the electorate which would be frustrated by the
Court's narrow understanding of the legislative process. In its opinion
the Court reasoned that any distribution going "beyond the apparent
needs of the 'due functioning of the [legislative] process' " falls outside
the scope of speech or debate protection..226 This betrays an understanding of the legislative process which excludes the participation of the
public, and, in my view, renders nugatory the "representative" aspect
of the informing function.
Nor is it any justification for the Court's narrow understanding
of the legislative function to characterize a host of legislative activities as
"political in nature rather than legislative," as was done in Brewster.2 7
A legislator's function is inherently political. The representation of
people by voicing their views and shaping policy accordingly is not
susceptible to the kind of distinction which separates "legislative" from
"political" activities. Such a distinction is an arbitrary straightjacket,2 2
imposed by courts which may not understand the legislative function. 20

225. See note 221 spra.
226. Doe v. McMillan, 412 U.S. 306, 317 (1973).
227. 408 U.S. at 512.
228. The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts seemed to recognize this
fact when it wrote in Coffin that it would extend protection to the "giving of a
vote, to the making of a written report, and to every other act resulting from the
nature, and in the execution of the office." Coffin v. Coffin, 4 Mass. 9, 31, 4 Tyng 1, 27
(1808) (emphasis added).
229. See generally 1973 Hearings, supra note 13.

Senator Ervin appraised the

Gravel formula in this manner:

[Flive of the Justices of the Supreme Court, none of whom has spent any
time in Congress, have concluded that the acquisition of information for hearings
and the communication of the results to the public are not integral parts of the
legislative process.
This definition of "legislative activity" reflects a lack of appreciation of the
things essential to the legislative process. As we all know, the formulation,
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A second, more fundamental objection exists to the internalexternal distinction drawn in Gravel. Even with respect to the activities
which meet Brewster's "purity" standard and are considered part of
the protected legislative process, the protection actually given is incomplete and ineffective. The definition extends protection to congressional actions such as the giving of a speech, the recording of a vote,
or the introduction into the record of remarks by a legislator. However,
it does not protect the completion of those congressional actions. Is a
legislator's speech given freely if the publication of it to the general
public is forbidden? In the Doe situation, has the Judiciary respected
the speech or debate clause by foreclosing questioning of the Congressmen themselves concerning their decisions but allowing those very
decisions to be frustrated because their agents cannot execute them?
The internal-external distinction is more of a problem when it is
used to separate a protected decision from its execution than when it is
used to distinguish among different kinds of activities engaged in by
a legislator. In my opinion, it is more crucial that activities which come
within the scope of the clause be protected in toto than that the scope
of protected activities be very broad. Allowing the courts to exercise
a prophylactic power of review over the admittedly protected activities
of a Congressman seems to be more of a contradiction of the "informing
function" than a wholesale exclusion of certain activities from the legislative process to which protection extends.
Despite all the objections expressed, the internal-external distinc-tion has some validity. Undoubtedly, the protection which the Framers
extended to any "speech or debate" by a Congressman must be given
greater weight the closer the activity is to the essential role of a legislator
in our governmental system. It is logical to protect activities related to
the role of representative and not to protect a Congressman's illegal
efforts to affect executive policy for his own personal gain. However,
it is not completely logical to separate a congressional decision from its
implementation, when the implementation consists of an attempt to put
before the public the decision made and the reasoning therefor. Insofar
as the Brewster-Gravel-Doeformula is used to break off this link in the
representative process, as in the mechanical Doe distinction between
consideration, and passage of legislation involves much much more than the
introduction of a bill, a few speeches and a vote.
Id. Part I, at 15.
A contrary view was expressed by Ms. Lawton, Assistant Attorney General,
Office of Legal Counsel, Department of Justice. She stated:
[It seems to me that the Court does understand the role of Congress, but
it is saying the Speech and Debate Clause covers less than that, it covers the
functioning of legislating, which is only one function of the Congress. . ..
Id., Part II, at 89.
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol20/iss1/4
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internal and external distribution of reports, it frustrates the representative process itself.
C.

The Douglas Approach

The early cases can be interpreted in terms of the type of interference with a citizen which was alleged."'0 Under this approach, where
there was alleged a material interference with the plaintiff's person or
property, the case fell outside of the clause.2 3' On the other hand, when
the alleged violation of a citizen's rights resulted from purely legislative
processes, the immunity was held to protect such activities. 232
In his concurring opinion in Doe, Justice Douglas adopted this
approach as the determinative one in the theory of the immunity, explaining that violations by the Congress of fourth amendment rights of
an individual, "like assaults with fists or clubs or guns - are outside
the protective ambit of the Speech or Debate Clause. ' 233 He then reasoned that violations of first amendment rights must also be reviewed
by the Court to determine whether or not such violations fell outside
speech or debate immunity. To him it was clear that "[v] iolations of
the commands of the first amendment are not within the scope of a
legitimate legislative purpose. "234
The determination of the type of right violated by congressional
actions is necessarily a part of the resolution of any speech or debate
case. For various reasons, it seems logical to curtail the protection in
cases where there has been tangible interference with the private citizen.
One reason is that the very phrasing of the clause more plausibly includes within its scope words, reports, votes, and so forth than other
congressional actions which affect private citizens in a more "physical"
or palpable manner.
However, Justice Douglas' approach in Doe is subject to criticism
insofar as he would have removed protection from a congressional communication which infringes upon possible constitutional rights of the
petitioners in that decision. The free exercise by Congressmen of their
"representative function" was clearly a very important protection in the
view of the writers of the Constitution, and it was not troublesome to
them that this exercise might occasionally impinge upon the rights of
230. See text accompanying notes 84 & 109 supra.
231. See, e.g., text accompanying notes 23, 35 & 36, 72, 78-80 supra.
232. See, e.g., text accompanying notes 46-48 supra.
233. 412 U.S. at 327-28 (Douglas, J., concurring).
234. Id. at 328 (emphasis omitted). Justice Douglas apparently saw a possibility
of first or fourth amendment violations in the inclusions of the plaintiffs' names in the
committee report. Id. at 328-30.
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individuals. 235 By any conceivable interpretation of the scope of the
clause, it is clear that the right of individuals to their good name will
sometimes be subjugated to the absolute freedom of speech of legislators.2 3 However, clear violations of the fourth and first amendments
by a Congressman or his agent were, in all probability, not intended
to have been protected by the inclusion of the speech or debate clause
in the Constitution. The very existence of the clause demands some sort
of distinction between cases wherein citizens are libelled by congressional
speech and those wherein their persons or possessions are physically
disturbed.
There is a further problem with the Douglas approach, even with
regard to cases where very tangible constitutional rights are allegedly
violated. The approach Douglas would take appears to be based upon
a judicial balancing of interest - the citizen's rights against the needs
of Congress. In effecting this balance, he would have allowed the Court
to investigate the merits of the underlying congressional decision itself.
In Doe he thus was able to condemn the wisdom of including the names
of private citizens in the committee report as "totally irrelevant to the
'
purposes of the study" by the committee. 37
Such judicial oversight
tends to do away with the immunity altogether, since it allows questioning of any and all congressional decisions. A "major purpose of [anyl1
23
immunity - removal of the burden of having to defend one's actions,'' 8
would be frustrated by an approach which would make everything depend upon a judicial balancing of Congress' and the citizen's interests.
The degree to which a citizen's constitutional rights are violated
is, of course, an important element of any theory of legislative immunities. However, a court which is asked to redress alleged violations
of an individual's rights by a congressional action'must also take into
account the implications of the separation of powers doctrine. It is not
sufficient to declare, as Douglas did, that courts "always have recognized
'judicial power to determine the validity of legislative actions impinging
on individual rights,' "239 and then plunge into the merits of the congressional decision. The intended purpose 24" and expressed words of
235. Chief Justice Burger in Brewster made this point clear :
In its narrowest scope, the clause is a very large, albeit essential, grant of
privilege. It has enabled reckless men to slander and even destroy others with
impunity, but that was the conscious choice of the framers.
408 U.S. at 516 (footnotes omitted).
236. It has never been seriously argued that courts may impose liability for a
speech in either House. regardless of how unrelated it was to the legislative process
or how much damage it did to a citizen. See note 247 and accompanying text iufra.
237. 412 U.S. at 330.
238. 87 HARv. L. REv. 221, 230-31 (1973).

239. Doe v. McMillan, 412 U.S. 306, 330 (1973).

240. See section IIIB supra, and notes 244-46 and
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol20/iss1/4
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the clause preclude accountability of the legislators to the courts or
anyone else. In the context of co-equal branches of government, a protection which guarantees independence in certain areas cannot be made
to depend upon another branch's judgment of the wisdom of decisions
made within the scope of that protected area. "To have such partial
protection is to have no meaningful protection at all." 24 '
D.

The Civil-CriminalDichotomy

A recent article suggested that the speech or debate clause was
primarily intended as a protection of Congress from the executive
branch. 242 The authors envisioned a civil-criminal distinction based on
the argument that in executive motivated suits the privilege serves its
historic function of preserving a separation of powers. 243 In this view,
private actions do not involve that executive-legislative conflict and do
not "generally represent so great an intrusion on legislative functions." '244 The analysis examined the scope of each aspect of the privilege
in Parliament, and drew conclusions from the relative importance of
one over another at particular times.
One must be careful, when interpreting the history of parliamentary
privilege, not to superimpose our own more refined and more specific
concepts of speech or debate immunity and privilege from arrest. The
oldest formulations of the privilege make it clear that the privilege was
not viewed as a conglomeration of piecemeal protections; rather it was
a general immunity, an integrated theory by which Parliament asserted
the right of its members to be free from outside interference. As such,
it was effective as a bar to civil suits - not only those for words spoken
but those brought for any reason whatsoever. That there were no
citizen's suits challenging the specific freedom of speech or debate by
Parliament means simply that no one even conceived that it was possible for a private citizen to charge Parliament with libel. 45 At a time
241. 87 HARV. L. REV. 221, 230-31 (1973).
242. Reinstein and Silverglate, supra note 2, passim. The authors advanced historical evidence for distinguishing between the two situations since it appears that the
speech or debate freedom was used by Parliament for the most part as a shield against
the Crown. Id. at 1123-35.
243. Id. at 1171.
244. Id. at 1172-73.
245. See generally C. WITTKE, TImE HISTORY OF ENGLISH PARLIAMENTARY
PRIVILEGE (1921) (hereinafter referred to as WITTKE). Wittke defined the origins
of the privilege in this way:
Very early in the history of Parliament, it became evident that members,
to be of any real service, must be free to attend all sessions, unmolested by
threats, insults, attacks, or arrests, whether they originated from the Crown,
the courts of law controlled by the Crown, or from private citizens . . . It was
regarded as essential that members should be free to deliberate on public questions
without concern for their private estates; their minds must be free from their
private fortune while they are engaged in the public service. So it became a
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when the King himself was less and less able to hold Parliament for its
speeches and proceedings, when a Member's estate and servants were
immune from civil suit no matter how tortious the action against an
individual, in or outside of Parliament, the very notion of a private
suit challenging a speech or debate in Parliament would have been
considered fantastic. 246
There is little contemporary evidence to show whether or not the
framers of the Constitution intended the scope of the speech or debate
clause in the federal system to be as wide as that enjoyed by Parliament.
However, the Court in Kilbourn, Tenney, and Dombrowski consistently
held that the scope of the clause was effectively coextensive in Executiveinitiated and private action cases.247
An argument for a civil-criminal distinction founded upon the
notion that private actions do not "generally represent so great an
intrusion on legislative functions '24S as executive-initiated suits must
be examined upon historical and theoretical grounds. Historically, the
"classic" case was one which involved "seditious libel" charges against
the Members of Parliament for their utterances. Of necessity, those
suits were initiated by the Crown and not private citizens in the classic
struggles of parliamentary history. In the present American governmental system, no such Executive-initiated libel suits exist. Whenever
the executive branch seeks to charge a Congressman it does so because
of its belief that a crime has been committed - not a crime of libel
against the Executive but an act against the criminal law to which
every citizen is subject. On the other hand, private libel suits against
Congress for things uttered or printed are very similar to the "classic"
case. A Congressman presently need not fear from the Executive for
statements he makes in either House, but he may soon be constrained
by the judiciary's willingness to entertain private suits challenging
things he says or orders to be printed.
"breach of privilege" to institute actions which might involve members' estates
while those members were sitting in Parliament.
Id. at 15-16. This is a general protection of the legislators' persons and possessions.
But see Reinstein & Silverglate, supra note 2, at 1148 n.180.
246. The original use of the privilege was as a protection against civil actions.
See Reinstein and Silverglate, supra note 2, at 1133. After the inception of the
privilege, over a century and a half elapsed before it was even asserted against the
Crown. Id. at 1123-26. Parliament was able to sell the protection of the privilege to
"complete outsiders" and thus could "place them beyond the reach of the common law"
altogether. Id. at 1137 n.127.
247. The early and often-cited case of Coffin v. Coffin, 4 Mass. 9, 4 Tyng 1
(1808), made it clear that no distinction was thought to exist; the Supreme Judicial
Court of Massachusetts there asserted that the privilige was secured for a legislator
in order to "support the rights of the people by enabling their representatives to
execute the functions of their office without fear of prosecutions, civil or criminal."
Id. at 9, 4 Tyng 27.
248. Reinstein & Silverglate, supra note 2, at 1172-73.
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol20/iss1/4
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Moreover, the dictates of separation of powers are as much at
issue in civil suits as in criminal cases. The question of who institutes
a suit is not the only factor in the bringing about of a separation of
powers problem. Perhaps more crucial are the steps taken by the
governmental body which ultimately acts. In civil suits, the danger is
that courts will interfere with the due functioning of the legislature by
questioning Congressmen concerning their legislative communications
and utterances. No Executive is needed to bring suit where there is
an unlimited number of individuals who will find it in their interests
to seek judicial relief against a legislator when their names or causes
are maligned. As has been stated often by the Supreme Court, the
purpose of the immunity is to protect legislators from both the
Executive and the judiciary: "It was not only fear of the executive
that caused the concern in Parliament but of the Judiciary as well, for
the judges were often lackeys of the Stuart monarchs ...."249 That
judges today no longer tend to be lackeys of any one does not diminish
the danger that they will interfere with the functioning of Congress of
their own accord.
IV.

TOWARD

A

DEFINITION

OF THE SCOPE OF

CONGRESSIONAL IMMUNITY

Two principles advanced by the Court, the internal-external distinction 250 and the degree-of-personal-interference approach, 25'1 provide
meaningful criteria for decisionmaking if properly understood. In this
section I shall develop an approach to the resolution of speech or debate
cases which uses those principles as important elements. The analysis
is calculated to propound ideas which should help solve, within a constitutional framework, the nice problem presented by legislative actions
which infringe the rights of individuals or disturb the peace of society,
while maintaining legislative independence and freedom of action. Also,
considered is the difficult separation of powers issue raised by the doctrine of congressional immunity: Who decides what scope of the protection is to be in specific cases ?
A.

The Elements of the Definition

A crucial distinction exists between cases wherein an individual's.
name is used in a derogatory fashion by a legislator and those wherein.
a more tangible or more physical interference with a citizen occurs.
This distinction now merits further consideration.
249. United States v. Johnson, 383 U.S. 169, 181 (1966)
250. See section IB supra.

(footnotes omitted)-
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As has been stated in earlier discussions, the phrasing used in the
Constitution itself makes it unmistakably clear that the protection its
drafters envisioned consisted, at a minimum, of words spoken in either
House by a Member of Congress. This literal wording is a powerful
argument in favor of placing communications and utterances of a
Congressman in a special place in the hierarchy of congressional activities covered by the clause. Beyond its literal wording, the clause
should be examined in terms of what it means in relation to the "privilege from arrest" clause which precedes it and with which it shares a
sentence. For, despite" the efforts of some commentators to separate
these two protections and'.view each in isolation, 22 the two combine to
represent the totality of protection for our legislature which carried over
from the British principle of parliamentary privilege.
The privilege from arrest clause protects legislators from being
arrested "during their attendance at the session of their respective
houses, and in going to and returning from the- same," except in cases
of "treason, felony, and breach of the peace." 2" ' The exceptions have
been interpreted by the courts to include all crimes,25 so that Congressmen appear not to be exempt from liability for ordinary criminal acts.2 "
Whether these exceptions are finally interpreted to allow prosecutions
for all possible crimes or not, the intention of the Framers is clear:
Congressmen are protected from civil arrests in actions for debt or
other civil suits, but are not immunized from arrest and prosecution for
ordinary actions tending to disrupt society's functioning. Thus the
privilege from arrest clause serves to mark out some boundaries to the
scope of the speech protection. Whatever kinds of activities are interpreted to be speech or debate, it is clear that breaches of the peace are
not protected by it.
This does not solve the problems posed by civil suits such as
Kilbourn and Dombrowski,"'6 but it sheds light upon them. In each
of those cases, the interference with the private citizen was of a kind
which approached the criminal notion of breach of the peace. The
incarceration of a private citizen in Kilbourn and the seizing of one's
papers in Dombrowski were acts so removed from "speech or debate"
252. See Reinstein and Silverglate, supra note 2, at 1139 n.139.
253. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6.

254. See, e.g., Williamson v. United States, 207 U.S. 425, 445-46 (1908).
255. It is not clear whether the exceptions would include criminal contempt
citations. Were criminal contempt to result from a refusal to obey a court challenging
an official action of a legislator, a situation could arise wherein the privilege from
arrest and speech or debate clauses would merge into one protection. In such a case,
there would seem to be a possibility of double coverage.
256. The question of who decides which congressional acts are within the coverage
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol20/iss1/4
of the clause remains. See section IVB infra.
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and so close to "breach of the peace" that they could be logically excluded from the protection of the clause.
Whether it be the Court or the Congress which ultimately decides
the scope of the protection, it appears that there exists some historical
and constitutional justification for distinguishing between activities
which are nearly "speech or debate" as those words are commonly
understood, and more physical kinds of congressional conduct. The
extension of a more complete protection to utterances and communications of Congressmen is consistent with the literal phrasing of the
Constitution. It accords with judicial interpretation of the exceptions
to the privilege from arrest clause, the complement of the speech or
debate clause. Further, it places in a duly important position the widely
acknowledged informing function of the Congress.
A second principle of some value found in the cases is the notion
that an activity merits more protection the more central it is to the
function of a legislator. In the earlier discussion herein, I rejected as
too narrow the notion which defines centrality in terms of proximity
to the activity of the proposing and passing of legislation, since it tends
to exclude activities
inextricably connected to the ordinary duties of a
Congressman. 25' 7 The notion of a "legislative process" is an inherently
misleading one, resulting from the Court's attempt to define the core of
a legislator's function. This attempt failed, probably because that function is viewed as though it were another kind of judicial decisionmaking.
Undoubtedly, analogies to the judicial function are useful, "5 8 if one
views the operations of the Congress as merely another kind of a trial,
where the interested parties are before the tribunal. However, a definition of the essential core of that activity could well exclude the majority
of the people represented, since they would be outside observers only.
The functions of the Congress cannot be so regarded. The legislative process, if it is anything, is a thing impossible to restrict by simple
geographical boundaries or circumscription of the number of participants. Unlike the judicial process, it is not limited to the parties before
it, and it is not necessarily directed at a single, clearly definable resolution of the issues being considered. It is as inherently amorphous as.
the judicial process is formal, and it is universal in application, whereas
the judicial resolution may be singularly applicable to the specific parties
before it. Thus a better principle is one by which a particular activity
is protected if deemed essential to the functions of a representative under
our system of government.
257. See section IIB supra.
258. See note 223

and accompanying text supra.
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The Court's attempt to define a "legislative process" in terms of
the internal-external functions2 5 0 has baffled and concerned many legislators. For good reason, they believe the Court has simply misunderstood their function. At the recent hearings of the Joint Committee on
Congressional Operations, Congressmen expressed dismay that anyone
would even attempt to define a "formal process of legislating."26
These legislators were obviously concerned with what they saw
as a judicial attempt to define their role in terms of some formal process,
or a neatly demarcated set of activities which could be considered official
while the rest are extracurricular. 261' To do this is to equate the legis-

lative function with the judicial one, which is disastrous.
However, the Court's attempt at defining centrality may not be
totally off the mark. Some acts now performed by legislators are only
peripherally connected to their functions as representatives. The ombudsman function of legislators should be scrutinized and an attempt made to
determine what aspects of that role are truly part of a representative's
function and what are merely favors done for personal gain. Speeches
and other communications by Congressmen outside their respective
Houses may or may not be related to their functions as legislators.
What is crucial is that the courts not try to restrict the scope of the
immunity by artificial notions of the location of the legislative process
or by simplistic separations of the political actions of Congressmen from
the role they play as makers of legislation.
Before leaving the criterion of centrality to the functions of a
representative, it is worthwhile to consider the problems presented by
the criminal cases, Brewster, Johnson, and Gravel. The issue raised by
Brewster and Johnson was not so much what activities should be immune, but what sort of questioning must be barred in order to protect
admittedly legislative functions. Those cases were concerned with
functional rather than definitional problems of the scope of the speech
or debate clause. Since the purpose of this analysis is definitional, it is
only necessary to reiterate my previous statement that an expansive and
not a narrow approach should be taken by the courts.26 2 Such an ap259. See text accompanying notes 187-91 supra.

260. See 1973 Hearings, supra note 13, pt. II, at 60. Congressman James C.
'Cleveland discussing United States v. Brewster, 408 U.S. 501 (1972), mentioned the
listing of activities considered "political" and thus not "purely legislative" and
-condemned it as "an utterly astounding assertion, suggesting that the Court labors
tin abysmal ignorance of the real process of representative government. Id., pt. I, at 5.
261. Cf. id., pt. I, at 4-7. As Congressman Cleveland put it: "Members of
Congress do not inhabit the same circumscribed environment as the chambers of
the Justices. The legislative life of the Representative is an inseparable whole."
Id. at 5.
262. See text accompanying notes 252-56 supra.
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol20/iss1/4
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proach is necessary because of the importance of the protection in
avoiding executive-initiated and judicially-entertained suits which may
destroy a legislator's career although no actual proof of a crime is ever
.
obtained26
The Gravel case involves both definitional and functional problems.
Insofar as it involves an attempt by the Congressman to inform the
general public of Executive actions, the Senator's actions deserve the
highest form of protection, since this is an integral part of his function
as a representative. 26 4 Conversely, in acquiring the informat-ion he
divulged, Senator Gravel may have committed criminal acts which
cannot come within the protection of the clause. However, here functional considerations may preclude judicial scrutiny. It may be impossible to question the Senator or his aide about possible criminal acts
without questioning the legislative act of preparing for and executing
a committee meeting. Or the acquisition of information may itself be
held to be a protected legislative act, insofar as it is not criminal. The
gathering of data is undoubtedly a crucial part of the function of a
representative. 26 5 As with the civil cases, the crucial definitional question is not what is essential to the formal process of enacting legislation
but what is a central part of the function of a representative under our
system of government.
B.

Who Defines the Scope of the Clause?

Underlying the entire discussion of the meaning and scope of the
speech or debate clause is the question of who determines the extent to
which the freedom protects Congress. The doctrine of separation of powers is at play in the consideration of this question. By its terms, the clause
precludes questioning by the courts of certain legislative acts. In order
to effectuate the meaning of the prohibition, a certain core of activities
must not be scrutinized by the courts at all; otherwise there is no real
independence even within the scope of the protection. Yet, can the
courts themselves determine the boundary of the protected region without unconstitutionally entering it in making that determination?
263. For a discussion of the various aspects of the question see Reinstein and
Silverglate, supra note 2 at 1157--63.

264. See section III-B supra.
265. See Reinstein and Silverglate, supra note 2 at 1153 where the authors state:
In order to propose legislation, debate and vote intelligently, and inform the
people about the workings of government, Congressmen must first be able to
inform themselves.
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The Judicial Approach

The Judiciary's answer has been to view the speech or debate
clause as a protection of congressional prerogatives in a very narrow
area whose boundaries can be defined by the courts under their general
power of review. Nearly every action of Congress or of individual
legislators is open to scrutiny to see if it is in accordance with the
Court's interpretation of what is allowable under the Constitution. This
power of reviewing almost all congressional conduct is in accordance
with the court proclaimed principle that the Supreme Court is the
ultimate interpreter of the Constitution. 66 In the Court's view, this
approach does no violence to the speech or debate clause since that
2
provision is understood not to bar any judicial review. 1
The Powell decision gives perhaps the strongest indication that at
present the Court understands the speech or debate clause as a personal
privilege enjoyed by Congressmen because of their status. It eliminates
any notion of the clause as a valuable protection of Congress as an
institution. Except for a very narrow region (utterances upon the floor
of each House) it leaves no conduct unquestioned, no congressional
activity unreviewed.
This understanding of the clause also brings with it a legislatoragent dichotomy, not as a theoretical principle upon which to base decisions,2"" but as a practical tool to avoid unnecessary clashes with
legislators or the legislature. The courts invoke speech or debate as a
personal protection that guarantees the dignity of a representative by
dismissing the charges against him but allowing them against the agent.
This saves the Court the embarrassment of deciding that a right against
a Congressman exists even though the privilege from arrest clause or
the speech or debate2 69clause may preclude enforcement against him by
compulsory process.
Governed by this judicial understanding of the
clause, and faced with situations like Doe, wherein a defenseless private
citizen seeks redress against the power of Congress, the courts can be
expected to use what they see as their full discretion to grant some form
of relief to the citizen.
266. See, e.g.,
Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 521 (1969).
267. In Powcll, for example, the Court relegated considerations of separation of
powers to the question of justiciability. Id. at 516-49. See text accompanying notes
116-18 supra.
268. See section IIA supra.
269. In Powell, for example, the Supreme Court avoided the problem of coercive
relief by use of the declaratory judgment device. It thus failed to deal with the
contention of the Congressmen that "federal courts cannot issue mandamus or injunctions compelling officers or employees of the House to perform specific official acts."
395 U.S. at 517.
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol20/iss1/4
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One may readily sympathize with the Court's efforts to grant some
sort of remedy to Doe-type plaintiffs. Under society's present notions,
that right is acquiring equal dignity with other constitutional protections
against more "physical" kinds of interference with one's papers or
person. In the absence of congressional action to safeguard the citizen's
right to his good name from the exigencies of internal congressional
operations, the courts see themselves as the last resort the citizen has.
These social demands and judicial notions of public policy and fairness
will tend to cause an erosion of the speech or debate protection even
beyond the Doe holding.
2.

The Constitutional Approach

While a diluted immunity may be consistent with present notions
of public policy, it is probably not consistent with the intentions of the
Framers, who seemed to consider the speech or debate clause more than
a personal privilege of legislators. Speech or debate was a protection
which embodied a broad principle of separation of powers, not a description of a narrow region within which legislators' conduct would
be unquestioned."' Thus James Wilson, one of the major architects
of the Constitution wrote:
In order to enable and encourage a representative of the publick
[sic] to discharge his publick [sic] trust with firmness and success, it is indispensably necessary, that he should enjoy the fullest
liberty of speech, and that he should be protected from the resentment of every one, however powerful, to whom the exercise of that
liberty may occasion offense.2 7'
It is clear that the protection was held in high esteem. Such a
regard must have derived from the historical importance that the clause
had in British history. As Wittke put it: "No privilege of parliament
.ismore essential than freedom of speech. Parliamentary government
has been described as 'government by talking' . . . .272 The architects
of our own system of government envisioned that speaking, arguing,
and debating would also be the essential activities of our legislature, and
in this they wanted Congress to have complete independence such as
Parliament finally obtained.
270. From a historical perspective, there is no way to prove conclusively the
truth of the above assertion, since the few references to the clause at the Constitutional
Convention and in the ratification debates do not address this point. See Reinstein
and Silverglate, supra note 2, at 1136.
271. 1 J. WILSON, WORKS OF JAMES WILSON 421 (McCloskey ed. 1967).
272. WITTKE,
supra
noteWidger
245, at
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However, the argument for congressional independence goes further. I believe the Framers intended that Congress should have complete independence in all its internal proceedings. Since parliamentary
government was thought to be a "government by talking," the speech
or debate protection would act as the keystone guarantee of the independence of our own legislature. The fact that no explicit constitutional
provision was written to shield all possible aspects of congressional
operations reflects their belief that speech or debate protection essentially
achieved that guarantee, and that, at any rate, there should be no need
for a more explicit guarantee of something they all agreed upon. The
whole notion of separation of powers was based upon the understanding
that no branch would interfere with the internal proceedings of the
2 18

other two.

To my mind, there is a strong connection between the independence
of each branch of our government and the constitutional protection of
speech or debate. In this sense, the clause is much more than a personal
prerogative to protect the dignity of Congressmen: It is a safeguard
for the institution of Congress, an explicit guarantee that its members
will not be hindered in the exercise of their legislative functions." 4
What this means in practical terms is that the Court must realize
that its discretion in the area of congressional immunity is very limited.
The notion that the clause does not preclude review of at least some
congressional conduct which is part of its internal proceedings must
be dismissed. Thus, a Court taking the constitutional approach would
have to restrain itself from examining the merits of congressional conduct, to refrain from imposing upon the Congress its own notions of
what character the Framers intended the internal proceedings of Congress to assume.
The courts must, of course, decide whether challenged congessional
action comes under the protection, but in doing so they should consult
less their own notions of what constitutes legislative acts and more
what Congress thinks them to be. In deciding what comes under the
protection, they should take the approach recommended in the Kilbourn
language - give immunity to "things generally done in a session of
'27 1
the House by one of its members in relation to the business before it. 1

273. James Wilson lucidly expressed this when he said:
The independency of each power consists in this, that its proceedings and
the motives, views, and principles which produce those proceedings, should be.
free from the remotest influence, direct or indirect, of either of the other two.
[branches.]
I J. WILSON, supra note 271, at 299.
274. See United States v. Johnson, 383 U.S. 169, 178 (1966).
275. Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U.S. 168, 204 (1881).
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Moreover, the courts should avoid delving into the merits of the legislator's conduct, as was done in Doe, where the Court set the limits
of the protection at the point where it thought the "reasonable requirements of the legislative function" ended.276 The Court should have
simply decided that the general area of communicating to the public
congressional proceedings was protected by the clause. That the Congress may have done so in a manner distasteful to the Court was
irrelevant. Nor was it an issue that some rights of individuals had been
abridged. The constitutional interpretations, including those regarding
the safeguarding of individual rights, were entrusted to Congress in
this area. In addition, a judicial pronouncement that would countermand Congress' directives with respect to publishing reports of its
proceedings would have been unthinkable to the Framers of the
277

Constitution.

Cases like Kilbourn and Dombrowski, however, are not so easily
decided. Their resolution depends greatly upon what Congress has done
to invoke judicial involvement in the activity of coercing testimony and
evidence. 8 If the Congress has given the courts legislation, as existed
in Kilbourn,279 calling for judicial resolution of contempt cases, then
there are good grounds for holding as was done in those cases. Thus,
two relevant grounds for review would exist: first, the fact that Congress itself has defined the limits of its independence by bringing the
judiciary into the process of coercing information from witnesses;
second, the strong justification for imposing liability when the violation
of rights involved is a very tangible one, characterized by a physical
interference with the individual's person and/or papers. These two
factors outweigh consideration of the centrality of the activity to the
representative function.
276. Doe v. McMillan, 412 U.S. 306, 316 (1973).
277. Id. at 344 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
278. See section IVC infra.
Theoretically Congress could withdraw jurisdiction from the courts to hear
a speech or debate case. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2; cf. Ex parte McCardle, 74 U.S.
(7 Wall.) 506 (1869); Sheldon v. Sill, 49 U.S. (8 How.) 440 (1850). In this
connection, I should state that I do not think Congress should use the "withdrawal
of jurisdiction" weapon as a means to keep the Court from reviewing the proceedings.
Aside from the problem of the constitutionality of any such withdrawal, where it

tends to abridge clear constitutional rights of plaintiffs, this is simply a negative
way to solve a problem and as such it is a non-solution. Legislators should realize
the validity of the judicial concern for individual rights and take positive action

themselves to guarantee those rights. See H. M. HART &H. WEc HSLER, THE FEDERAL
COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEMS 309-79 (2d ed. P. Bator, P. Mishkin, D. Shapiro, &
H. Wechsler 1974). For a discussion of the limits of congressional power to withdraw
jurisdiction when a case effects the constitutional rights of individuals, see R. BERGER,
COURT 282-89 (1969).
279. In Kilbourn, the Congress took it upon itself to incarcerate the plaintiff, even
though it had previously established judicial remedies to deal with witnesses held in
CONGRESS V. THE SUPREME
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Recommendations

In order to make meaningful recommendations upon this issue,
one must look at the problem both from the viewpoint of the Congress
and from that of the judiciary. Each must change its course if the two
are not to drift apart upon this issue to the point that a clash becomes
inevitable.
Since neither forum alone is entirely capable of resolving this
crucial separation of powers question, the solution requires input from
each. The Congress must consider the stature accorded by the judiciary
to certain rights of individuals, a consideration it is not accustomed to
accounting for in its decisionmaking processes. Similarly, the judiciary
must look at congressional conduct in determining the boundaries of its
own constitutional power, a task which it has not lately been wont to
perform. Each branch must pay close attention to the progress of the
other in this issue, seeking a constitutional synthesis with which each
can comfortably deal.
With regard to the rights of private citizens whose names have
been used in its proceedings, Congress could authorize a form of process
by which the citizens could come to the bar of either House, file conplaints, and receive expeditious, fair consideration of their grievances.
In a case like Doe, it should be very simple, and not politically troublesome, to excise the names of the citizen-plaintiffs before any distribution
of the report goes out. Furthermore, Congress could establish a procedure similar to a temporary restraining order by which it could, at
the instance of such a citizen, withhold outside dissemination of any
report or other communication so challenged pending a full hearing of
the merits of the question.
With respect to situations like Domnbrowski and Kilbourn, where
a committee or Member is in need of certain papers or of the personal
appearance of a witness, the Congress should decide how this is to be
done by the Members or committees. It can either involve the courts
by legislation that calls for judicial enforcement of congressional subpoenas or it can resort to its own enforcing powers by use of the sergeant
at arms. My recommendation is that Congress involve the courts in
those actions. Potentially, such acts affect clear constitutional rights of
citizens, rights the Congress has a duty to uphold. Insofar as a balance between those rights and the needs of Congress need be struck,
the courts could well serve to resolve the possible conflicts. They are
detached from the issue; and it has traditionally been their function to
weigh such competing needs. A congressional decision to involve the
courts in this manner furthers the goals of the separation of powers
doctrine, by assigning to each branch that which it does best.
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol20/iss1/4
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Depending upon what Congress does, the courts should act
accordingly. Even if the Congress were to make no attempt to safeguard
the right of the citizen to a good name from being abridged by its own
communications and reports, the courts should check their desire to
interfere. For each of the elements of the formulation developed above
indicate that this kind of case should fall clearly within the protection
of the clause. The printing of a committee report - to use the Doe
example - is very close to being "speech or debate" as the common
man understands those words, and the interference with the citizen is
hardly of a "physical" or "direct" kind. Mforeover the congressional
conduct here is very central to the functions of a representative. One
can envision the effect upon Congress' independent functioning which
would result from its having committee reports stopped by judicial fiat
while the legislation that those reports support becomes effective and
must be interpreted by the people and the other branches of government.
If the Congress were to revoke the legislation by virtue of which
courts are involved in the process of coercing testimony and evidence
needed by committees, there is no clear answer to the question posed
by these circumstances. The courts must use their wits to construe
conflicting constitutional policies, one calling for protection of individual
rights from unreasonable searches and deprivation of their liberty, and
another for the independence of Congress in its proceedings. Under
these circumstances the courts can hardly be faulted for taking the road
that leads to judicial interference with the proceedings of Congress.
Yet in resolving these difficult questions, the courts should be
careful not to overstate the scope of their own role in order to review
all congressional conduct.28 ° However impressive the arguments are in
favor of judicial review of congressional legislation, the courts must
not forget that this power derives from the nature of their role as
interpreters of the law in appropriate cases. 281 The duty to review
legislation does not extend to "policing or advising legislatures or
executives, nor even, as the uninstructed think, of standing as an everopen forum for the ventilation of all grievances that draw upon the
Constitution for support."
The speech or debate clause is a manifestation of the Framers'
intent to entrust an area of conduct to the legislature alone. Within that
area, it is the Congress who is the ultimate interpreter of the Constitution. Unfortunately, the notion has been embedded in the minds of
many that the courts alone are always the "ultimate interpreters" of the
280. See text accompanying notes 278 & 279 supra.
281. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803).
282. Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of ConstitutionalLaw, 73 I-lAzv. L. Rrv.
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Constitution. Moreover, that notion has been carelessly adopted by
the Supreme Court in recent pronouncements. 8 3 Thomas Jefferson
considered such a notion to be "a very dangerous doctrine indeed, and
284
one which would place us under the despotism of an oligarchy.
I cannot here judge the truth of Jefferson's assertion with respect to
the overall functioning of our government. However,I can say that a
court laboring under such a misunderstanding of the Framers' intent
must inevitably transgress the boundaries of its own constitutional domain and invade the area of absolute independence which was bestowed
upon the Congress by the speech or debate clause.
283. E.g., Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 521 (1965), quoting Baker v.
Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 211 (1962).
284. T. JEFFERSON, THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, Letter to William C.
Jarvis, Sept. 8, 1820 160 (Ford ed. 1899).

https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol20/iss1/4

50

